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Abstract
Relying on microeconomic data, we examine the impact of the Roll Back Malaria
(RBM) campaigns on the educational attainment of primary schoolchildren across 14
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Combining a difference-in-differences approach with
an instrumental variables analysis, we exploit exogenous variation in pre-campaign
malaria risk and exogenous variation in exposure to the timing and disbursements of
the RBM campaign. In 13 of 14 countries, the RBM campaign substantially improved
schooling attainment at an average cost of $ 13.19 per additional year, which is highly
cost-effective as compared to standard educational interventions.
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1 Introduction
Despite decades-long efforts, malaria remains a life-threatening disease. In 2013 alone, there
were roughly 198 million cases of malaria, resulting in an estimated 584,000 deaths.1 For
those who survive, malaria also poses a significant challenge to educational attainment. Con-
tracting malaria, especially at a young age, disrupts school attendance and may result in
lifelong health and cognitive disorders (Cutler et al. (2010); Bleakley (2010); Lucas (2010);
Venkataramani (2012)).2 Our objective in this paper is to examine the impact of large-
scale, contemporaneous malaria control efforts on education. Relying on a microeconomic
analysis of unprecedented coverage for 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, we study the
medium-term impact (0-10 years) of major anti-malarial campaigns on the educational at-
tainment of primary school students. We find that, even when compared to standard health
and educational interventions (Kremer, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Kremer and Holla,
2009; Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2009), national-level malaria control appears to be a
particularly cost-effective strategy to improve educational attainment, with an average cost
of roughly $ 13.19 per additional year.
In 1998, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched a new campaign to halve
malaria deaths worldwide by 2010 (Nabarro and Tayler, 1998), a target achieved in 2014.
With this goal came the need to establish a global framework for coordinated action against
malaria — and the Roll Back Malaria (RBM) Partnership was born.3 Many initiatives
arose in support of RBM. Following its formation in 2002, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria was the largest source of external funding for malaria control.
The Global Fund expanded its commitments to malaria control efforts from $68 million
disbursed the year of its inception to over $1 billion per year by the late 2000s (see Pigott
et al. (2012)). It operates in 47 of the 48 Sub-Saharan African countries.4 The President’s
Malaria Initiative, launched in 2005 by President George W. Bush, and the World Bank
Booster Program for Malaria Control in Africa entered the fight a few years later, each
program contributing significant funds in support of malaria control.
1See the World Health Organization’s website: http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/malaria/
en/.
2See also Clarke et al. (2008), Thuilliez et al. (2010), and Nankabirwa et al. (2013).
3More information can be found at the website of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership: http://www.rbm.
who.int/.
4Seychelles is the exception.
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By 2010, external sources were putting forth nearly $2 billion annually for malaria control
(Pigott et al., 2012). Sponsored control efforts focus on the treatment of clinical cases as
well as on prevention among populations who are the most at-risk through artemisinin-
combination therapies (ACTs).5 They also seek to limit the transmission of the disease
from mosquitoes to human beings with insecticide treated nets (ITNs) and indoor residual
spraying (IRS).6 Because they face the most acute symptoms and highest risks of death,
the primary targets of most control efforts are children under five and pregnant women. In
Zanzibar, for example, Bhattarai et al. (2007) show that RBM-sponsored interventions have
indeed allowed for a substantial decrease in infant mortality.
In 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, we first show that malaria has been decreasing
since the first disbursements of the RBM malaria control campaigns, particularly in areas
where initial malaria risk was highest. Given that malaria control is RBM’s main objective,
this outcome is to be expected. Bednet and drug usage respond similarly. We provide
additional suggestive evidence that infant fever and mortality improve as malaria risk falls,
as do educational outcomes. We then turn to our research question by more carefully isolating
the impact of the RBM anti-malaria campaigns on the educational attainment of primary
school students. Our empirical strategy combines a difference-in-differences approach with
an intrumental variables (IV) analysis, similar to several important studies on the effect of
historical malaria eradication programs (Cutler et al., 2010; Bleakley, 2010; Lucas, 2010;
Venkataramani, 2012).
The difference-in-differences approach exploits variation in pre-campaign malaria risk
(as measured by the Malaria Atlas Project) at the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)
cluster level, as well as exogenous variation in children’s exposure to the RBM campaign
(lifetime disbursements since the start of the campaign). Indeed, as already stressed, evi-
dence suggests that areas with higher pre-campaign malaria risk benefit relatively more from
anti-malaria campaigns than areas with lower pre-campaign malaria risk, a pattern already
identified by previous papers that have analyzed the impact of mid-twentieth century malaria
eradication campaigns. In this setting, DHS clusters with higher pre-campaign malaria risk
5Artemisinin and its derivatives are a group of drugs that possess the most rapid action of all current
drugs against P. falciparum malaria.
6These approaches are sometimes combined with larval control which eliminates mosquitoes at their larval
stage. However, due to its detrimental environmental effects and poor cost-effectiveness, larval control is
recommended only for specific settings.
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are more likely to be treated by the campaign than DHS clusters with lower pre-campaign
malaria risks. Moreover, we capture exposure to the treatment by the yearly amount per
capita (in USD) disbursed by RBM during a child’s lifetime. To do so, we rely on at least two
DHS survey rounds per country: one that is pre-campaign or the closest to the campaign’s
start date and another that is the latest conducted (as of January 2014). Our purpose is to
collect information on both children who are unexposed (or barely exposed) and those who
are fully exposed. Consequently, exposure to the treatment varies along two dimensions:
across age cohorts for a single DHS survey round and across DHS survey rounds for a single
age cohort. We present timelines of these countries in Figure 1.
Yet, pre-campaign malaria risk at the DHS cluster level is possibly endogenous. We
therefore instrument pre-campaign malaria risk with several standard sets of instrumental
variables that rely on geographic, climatic and genetic data (Kiszewski et al., 2004; Bleakley,
2010; Cutler et al., 2010; Burlando, 2012). Our instrumented results are consistent with the
original OLS results. We find that, for the average 10 year-old student in our dataset, one
more dollar per capita disbursed each year yields, on average, a yearly increase in grade by
roughly $ 13.19, making RBM a cost-effective means to increase school participation com-
pared to various other educational interventions (Kremer, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004;
Kremer and Holla, 2009; Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2009). Our results do not appear
to stem from alternative mechanisms. In particular, they are not driven by a mean-reversion
effect whereby educational outcomes in DHS clusters in the treatment group converge to
those of DHS clusters in the control group before the campaign. Nor are our results biased
by individuals’ migration from a specific type of cluster to another or specific to the measure
of pre-campaign malaria risk that we use.
Large-scale health interventions have the potential to generate important spillovers on ed-
ucation. For example, nation-wide efforts to reduce disease prevalence (e.g. Bleakley (2010);
Cutler et al. (2010); Lucas (2010); Venkataramani (2012)) and improve health care (e.g. Jay-
achandran and Lleras-Muney (2009)) have been shown to boost literacy rates and educational
attainment. But pinpointing such effects is not a given (Bleakley, 2010). While healthier
children are more capable of learning, increased longevity from better health does not neces-
sarily increase parents’ incentives to invest in their offspring’s education. On one hand, the
longer the stream of payouts, the more valuable the investment. Increased longevity should
4
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therefore translate into more parental investment in education, hence into greater educa-
tional attainment (Ben-Porath, 1967; Soares, 2005; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009).
But, on the other hand, a higher life expectancy affects not only the returns to children’s
quality but also the returns to their quantity. Greater longevity might therefore result in no
increase in the level of education chosen by the parents (Hazan and Zoabi, 2006) and could
even reduce income per capita (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2007). Moreover, better childhood
health may increase the opportunity cost of going to school, particularly in poor countries,
since a healthier child can earn more on the labor market (Bleakley, 2010).
Our paper improves upon the existing literature in at least three ways. First, the scope
of our analysis (14 countries and 355,528 students) is unprecedented. While one of the
advantages of a quasi-experimental approach over a randomized experiment is that it can be
replicated over a larger population, the maximum number of countries covered by previous
quasi-experimental studies on malaria is only four (see Bleakley (2010)).7 Second, contrary to
the bulk of previous studies, we do not focus on the malaria periphery, i.e. the set of countries
characterized by species of Plasmodium (P. vivax, P. ovale and P. malariae) relatively less
harmful to health. We concentrate instead on Sub-Saharan Africa where P. falciparum, the
most aggressive of all species, is dominant. Third, we study contemporaneous, international
control efforts. This allows us to make an important distinction from previous analyses that
focus on historical malaria eradication in the 1920s-1950s (Bleakley, 2010) and the 1950s
(Cutler et al., 2010; Lucas, 2010; Venkataramani, 2012). In this way, we can conduct a
cost-effectiveness analysis, which is useful for policy-makers currently involved in improving
learning in developing countries. Our findings highlight the importance of evaluating and
investing in large-scale health interventions with respect not only to their primary health
outcomes but also to their spillover effects on education. As such, they shed further light
on the benefits of subsidizing health interventions (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Cohen and
Dupas, 2010; Dupas, 2014; Tanaka, 2014; Cohen, Dupas and Schaner, 2015).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide suggestive evidence that the
RBM malaria control campaigns have decreased malaria risk and hence improved health
and educational outcomes in Sub-Saharan Africa. We present our empirical strategy in
Section 3. Section 4 displays our results. We discuss our findings in Section 5. Finally,
7These four countries are Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and the United States.
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Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and highlights avenues for future research.
2 Suggestive evidence on RBM’s effectiveness
In this section, we first show that malaria has been decreasing since the first disbursements
of the RBM malaria control campaigns, particularly in areas where initial malaria risk was
highest. Bednet and chloroquine usage follow a similar trend. Moreover, we provide tentative
evidence that infant fever and mortality improve as malaria prevalence falls, as do educational
outcomes.
2.1 Impact on malaria risk
The WHO launched the first worldwide malaria eradication program in 1955. Its strategy
centered on spraying houses with residual insecticides, antimalarial drug treatment, and
surveillance. However, the most malarious areas, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, were excluded
(Alilio, Bygbjerg and Breman, 2004). Newly independent states in Africa thus relied on
sponsored efforts at the margin: residual insecticide spraying in urban centers or larvacide in
limited areas, national health systems and malaria control programs already operational by
the 1950s, hospitals and dispensary-based antimalarial activities, mass drug administration
and availability of antimalarial drugs in the open market. The extensive use of residual in-
secticide dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane (DDT) and chloroquine (CQ)3 did benefit Africa
as the overall trend of malaria-related deaths showed evidence of decline from the 1950s to
1980s. However, these activities induced the development of both drug and insecticide resis-
tance (Santolamazza et al., 2008). The evolution in Sub-Saharan Africa of the cumulative
probability of dying from malaria for children under five8 is consistent with the emergence of
such resistance. As shown in Figure 2, this cumulative probability has indeed been increasing
between 1980 and the early 2000s.
Did the first major disbursements of the RBM malaria control campaigns in 2003 counter
this trend in Sub-Saharan Africa? Figure 2 depicts a continuous decreasing trend in the
cumulative probability of dying from malaria which occurs primarily after the creation of
8This cumulative probability refers to the total number of children under five out of 1,000 who are likely
to die from malaria in the absence of all other causes. The data come from the Institute for Health Metrics
and Evaluation (IHME) at http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/.
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the Global Fund in 2002. To provide stronger evidence of an impact of the RBM malaria
control campaigns on malaria, we examine the evolution of malaria risk over the 2000-2012
period, on a panel of 120 regions from the 14 Sub-Saharan countries that enter our main
analysis.
We proxy for malaria risk by relying on the P. falciparum parasite rate (PfPR). This
variable is provided by the Malaria Atlas Project for the year 2010.9 For a given year, it
describes the estimated proportion of individuals in the general population who are infected
with P. falciparum at any given time, averaged over 12 months. These estimates are gener-
ated by a geostatistical model that relies on parasite rate surveys as well as bioclimatic and
environmental characteristics.10 As such, the PfPR provides a measure of the intensity of
malaria transmission that is both geographically precise and contemporaneous.
Figure 3 plots the mean PfPR for all countries in our sample across the time period 2000-
2012. It shows a clear turning point in malaria transmission intensity from the early 2000s.
We then plot the change in PfPR while conditioning on the mean initial value of PfPR (in
the year 2000) at the regional level. Figure 4a again shows no significant change between
2000 and 2002. Yet, Figures 4b and 4c reveal a striking pattern: the higher the initial level
of malaria risk, the stronger the decrease in the periods following the start of disbursements
in 2003. Overall, we find suggestive evidence that, not only did the RBM campaign reduce
malaria risk, but that this reduction was strongest in regions with the greatest initial malaria
burdens.
Does this imply that regions with the highest burdens also benefit the most from malaria
control campaigns? We complement our analysis by examining two strategies used in malaria
control: the use of bednets for children under five years of age and the use of chloroquine
for treating fever in children and pregnant women. While we expect bednet use to increase
during this time period, chloroquine use should decrease due to substitution of more effective
treatments (ACTs) (Flegg et al., 2013).11 Figures 5a to 5c plot the change in the use of
these strategies between the most recent and earliest DHS rounds against the initial value
9The year 2010 is publicly available at http://www.map.ox.ac.uk/browse-resources/endemicity/Pf_
mean/world/. We sincerely thank Peter Gething for providing the yearly data (from 2000-2012) through
personal communication.
10Gething et al. (2011) describe the estimation process.
11Malawi was the first African country to replace chloroquine in 1993, followed by Kenya in 1998 and
Tanzania in 2000 (see Mohammed et al. (2013)).
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of PfPR at the regional level. The plots, in addition to simple regressions, conform to our
expectations. This suggests that the most at-risk regions prior to the campaign experienced
comparatively larger improvements in malaria control over time.
2.2 Impact on health
The changing risk of malaria over time may have effects on health outcomes. DHS surveys
allow us to exploit two health outcomes: the onset of fever within the last two weeks for
children under five and the probability for a child born in the five years prior to a given DHS
survey to be dead rather than alive at the time of this survey.
We start by analyzing the contemporaneous effect of malaria risk on health outcomes. To
do so, we make use of a naturally occurring counterfactual. Several inherited factors influence
malaria infection. For example, individuals who carry the sickle cell trait (heterozygotes for
the abnormal hemoglobin gene HbS) are relatively protected against severe disease and
death caused by P. falciparum malaria. The frequency of hemoglobin-related disorders and
other blood cell dyscrasias, such as Hemoglobin C, Thalassemia, and glucose-6-phosphate
dehydrogenase (G6PD) deficiency, also provide natural protection from malaria.
Two measures of inherited blood disorders are available in the MAP database: the fre-
quency of G6PD deficiency and the frequency of the sickle cell trait. To our knowledge,
G6PD deficiency has not been associated with poor educational or cognitive outcomes (Ol-
son et al., 2009) whereas the sickle cell trait has been associated with central nervous system
complications (Armstrong et al., 1996). We therefore rely on the frequency of G6PD defi-
ciency at the regional level to proxy for a region’s natural protection against malaria. Given
that it has no known direct impact on any variables other than malaria risk (Cappellini and
Fiorelli, 2008), G6PD deficiency is indeed less at risk of bias from omitted variables when it
comes to analyzing the impact of malaria on health and on education (see Section 2.3.).
We measure the contemporaneous effect of malaria risk on health outcomes by relying
on Equation (1):
yirct = α+β.(LowG6PDr×PfPRrt)+γ.LowG6PDr+δ.PfPRrt+Xirct′.Ξ+φr+φc+φt+irct.
(1)
In this equation, yirct is the outcome for individual i in region r who belongs to cohort c
8
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(the group of individuals born in year c) and is interviewed in year t; Xirct are individual-level
controls (gender, age and wealth12 ); φr are region fixed effects; φc are cohort fixed effects;
and φt are DHS survey year fixed effects. The variable of interest is the interaction term
between LowG6PDr and PfPRrt. Variable LowG6PDr is binary. It is equal to 1 if region
r shows a low prevalence of G6PD deficiency (i.e. its mean prevalence of G6PD deficiency
is lower than the mean of all regions) and to 0 otherwise. Variable PfPRrt captures PfPR
in region r at date t. The coefficient of the interaction term, β, therefore measures the
differential effect of an increase in malaria risk in regions with low relative to high natural
protection against malaria risk. We therefore expect a positive sign when yirct stands for fever
within the last two weeks or for death probability and a negative sign when yirct captures
educational attainment.
When we analyze the impact of malaria on fever, we augment Equation (1) by inter-
acting (LowG6PDr × PfPRrt) with an indicator for whether the child was surveyed during
the rainy season. Similarly, when we analyze the impact of malaria on the probability of
death for a child under five, we augment Equation (1) by interacting (LowG6PDr×PfPRrt)
with an indicator for whether the child was surveyed during the rainy season if alive and
died during the rainy season if deceased. In both cases, we obviously control for all the
subcomponents of the triple interaction term not already included in Equation (1). Because
malaria transmission is strongly correlated to wetter weather, we are more likely to isolate
fever effects that come from malaria (and not other factors) when we focus on the rainy
season. Several studies clearly show that the malaria-attributable fraction of fevers among
children and school-age children is higher during the rainy season (Clarke et al., 2004; Dicko
et al., 2005; Thuilliez, 2010).
Results are reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 1. We observe that the coefficient of
the triple interaction term is positive and significant. In other words, an increase in malaria
risk in historically less protected regions enhances children’s morbidity and mortality when
the latter are measured during the rainy rather than dry season. This result is consistent
with a negative impact of malaria risk on health outcomes. Note that PfPRrt is potentially
endogenous: omitted variables, such as a negative shock at date t on household’s ability
12Wealth is an asset-based index ranging from one (poorest) to five (richest). More precisely, 1 stands for
“poorest”, 2 for “poorer”, 3 for “middle”, 4 for “richer”, and 5 for “richest”.
9
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.75R (Version révisée)
to adopt preventative antimalarial strategies could increase both children’s morbidity and
mortality as well as malaria risk. In columns 2 and 4 of Table 1, we therefore provide results
that stem from lagging PfPRrt by one year. Our conclusions remain unchanged.
Thus, we can conclude that malaria is detrimental to health outcomes. But do the RBM
anti-malaria campaigns counter malaria? Figures 4a to 4c suggest that the most at-risk
areas are the main targets of this campaign. Therefore, if the RBM initiative has a positive
impact on health outcomes, we should observe an amelioration of these outcomes after the
campaign’s start date in areas with initially higher levels of PfPR. To test for this hypothesis,
we estimate Equation (2):
yirctime = α+β.(time×PfPR2000)+γ.time+δ.PfPR2000+Xirct′.Ξ+φr+time.φr+φc+irctime.
(2)
In Equation (2), the dummy “time” is equal to 1 if a respondent was surveyed during
the last DHS round available for a given country and to 0 if he was surveyed during the first
DHS round (the one closer to the RBM campaign’s start date). Variable PfPR2000 captures
PfPR in year 2000 at the DHS cluster level. Variable yirctime is the outcome for individual
i in region r who belongs to cohort c and is interviewed during either the first or the last
DHS round. The coefficient of the interaction term, β, therefore measures, within a given
region, the differential evolution of yirctime in DHS clusters showing higher relative to lower
initial malaria risk. We therefore expect a negative sign when yirctime stands for fever within
the last two weeks or for death probability. By contrast, a positive sign should appear when
yirctime captures educational attainment.
As with Equation (1), Equation (2) is in fact a baseline equation. This means that we
augment Equation (2) with a triple interaction term that allows us to measure the marginal
effect of the dependent variable during the rainy rather than dry season. Results are reported
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2. They confirm that the coefficient of the triple interaction
term is negative and significant, which suggests a positive impact of the RBM campaign on
health outcomes.
10
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2.3 Impact on education
The impact of health improvements (through interventions) on education is not obvious. To
be sure, reduction in malaria-related morbidity increases children’s ability to learn through
three main channels. First, malaria during pregnancy can lead to foetal growth retardation
which translates into cognitive and physical impairments among children (Barreca, 2010).
Second, during early childhood (under the age of five),13 complicated forms of malaria may
develop rapidly. The effects of severe malaria, better known as cerebral malaria, have been
quantified by numerous studies.14 Third, even during late childhood, the protection conferred
by acquired immunity is only partial. Clinical malaria can have a non-cognitive impact on
educational achievement via school absenteeism, general health conditions, and investment
in curative strategies (coping strategies against the disease detrimental to educational in-
vestments) (Clarke et al., 2008; Thuilliez et al., 2010; Nankabirwa et al., 2013). However, as
previously stressed, better health does not necessarily pave the way for greater educational
investments.
We focus in this section on three educational outcomes provided by DHS surveys for
children enrolled in primary school: grade level during the current school year, total years
of schooling completed and delay status for current grade level. A student is considered
delayed if her grade is below the average grade of students of the same age at the national
level. We rely on the procedure by Moock and Leslie (1986) to capture delay status. In
doing so, we first regress the logarithm of grade on the logarithm of age in each country of
our sample. We then estimate the predicted grade level for each individual in each of these
countries. Finally, we create a dummy variable that is equal to one if a student’s observed
grade level is lower than its predicted value.
Columns 5 to 10 of Table 1 report the OLS estimates of coefficient β in Equation (1).
They confirm that educational outcomes worsen as malaria levels increase in historically less
protected regions. Columns 3 to 5 of Table 2 report the OLS estimates of coefficient β in
Equation (2). They reveal that, in a given region, educational outcomes improve between
the first and the last DHS round, the higher the initial level of PfPR at the DHS cluster
level. These findings not only suggest that malaria risk is detrimental to education but also
13Acquired immunity in children does not play an efficient protective role until the age of 5 to 6, even in
highly endemic areas. This fact highlights why malaria is a major threat to child survival.
14See Mung’ala-Odera, Snow and Newton (2004) for a literature review.
11
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.75R (Version révisée)
that the RBM anti-malaria campaigns which primarily target the most at-risk areas have a
positive effect on educational outcomes.
Note that this impact of health on education may partly capture the influence of health
on fertility. Estimates reported in columns 5 to 10 of Table 1 reveal that health improvements
increase parents’ incentives to invest in their children’s education. Put differently, returns
to quality increase more than returns to quantity, meaning that parents’ target number of
live births should decrease (Soares, 2005; Bleakley and Lange, 2009). However, it is unclear
whether the total number of live births per woman should ultimately drop, since a decrease
in malaria risk might increase the fertility window for women (Lucas, 2013). Despite parents’
lower targets of live births, the number of live births may thus raise. Therefore, the number
of children alive may also increase: not only does lower malaria risk improve their likelihood
of being alive at birth, but it also increases their chances of surviving. In this case, the
impact of health on education will be lower than in a situation where parents would be able
to meet their lower desired fertility. A higher number of children is indeed known to depress
the schooling progress of all children in the family (Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009).
There is no clear evidence on the relationship between malaria and fertility in Africa.
We try to explore this issue by comparing the effects of the campaign on a woman’s ideal
number of children, her total number of live births and how many of her children are alive.
A change in malaria risk might affect households’ ideal number of children, without actually
translating into a change in the total number of live births or in the number of children alive,
at least in the medium-term (0-10 years).
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 report the OLS estimates of coefficient β in Equation (1)
when we focus on the logarithm of one plus the ideal number of children and the total
number of live births for women aged between 15 and 49. Column 5 presents these estimates
when the dependent variable is the number of children alive.15 Columns 7, 8 an 9 of Table 3
report the OLS estimates of coefficient β in Equation (2) for each of these three dependent
variables. A contemporaneous increase in malaria risk (column 1) enhances the ideal number
of children while a medium-term decrease due to the RBM campaign (column 7) reduces
this number. However, this contemporaneous to medium-term variation in malaria risk does
15Results presented in columns 1, 3 and 5 are robust to relying on the lagged value of PfPRrt in Equation
(1) (see columns 2, 4 and 6 of Table 3).
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not translate into a variation in the actual number of births (columns 3 and 8), nor in the
number of children alive (columns 5 and 9).
3 Empirical strategy
We now turn to our research question by more carefully isolating the impact of the RBM anti-
malaria campaigns on the educational attainment of primary school students. Our empirical
strategy combines a difference-in-differences approach with an IV analysis. In this section,
we first present our baseline specification. We then explain how we refine this specification in
order to address remaining endogeneity issues. Finally, we provide evidence that the parallel
trend assumption, the key condition for a difference-in-difference to isolate a causal impact,
holds: prior to the RBM campaign, educational outcomes of individuals in the control and
in the treatment group do not converge.
3.1 Baseline specification
According to Pigott et al. (2012), the three largest funders of anti-malaria campaigns to
date, aside from governments themselves, are the Global Fund (since 2003), the President’s
Malaria Initiative (since 2006), and the World Bank Booster Program for Malaria Control
in Africa (since 2006). Data on disbursements, kindly provided by David Pigott, allow us to
construct a measure of exposure to the RBM campaign. This variable captures the yearly
amount per capita (at the country level)16 that these three major funders have disbursed
during a child’s lifetime. A child’s lifetime is defined as the difference between the DHS
survey year and this child’s year of birth, from which we subtract one year. We consider
a child’s exposure to begin in utero (though defining the beginning as the year after birth
does not alter our results).17 Variation in exposure of children in a given country therefore
16Yearly population data come from the World Development Indicators.
17To illustrate the construction of this variable, we take the example of Ethiopia. As reported in Figure
2, the RBM anti-malaria campaigns started in 2003 in Ethiopia. Moreover, three DHS surveys years are
available (in 2000, 2005 and 2010). Let’s consider a child born in 1999. If this child is surveyed in 2000,
she experiences no exposure since the RBM disbursements were to begin only in 2003. If she is surveyed
instead in 2005, she experiences three years of exposure to RBM disbursements. Her exposure variable will
therefore be equal to the sum of the RBM disbursements per capita during these three years, divided by
her lifetime, hence 2005-(1999-1)=7 years. Similarly, if this child is surveyed in 2010, she experiences eight
years of exposure to RBM disbursements. Her exposure variable will therefore be equal to the sum of RBM
disbursements per capita during these eight years, divided by her lifetime, hence 2010-(1999-1)=12 years.
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depends on the variation in DHS rounds and on the variation in children’s dates of birth.
We define our difference-in-differences approach in Equation (3):
educijct = α + β.(exposurect × PfPR2000j) + Xijct′.Γ + δj + δc + δt + ijct. (3)
In Equation (3), educijct is an educational outcome
18 of primary school student i in DHS
cluster j, who belongs to cohort c and is interviewed in year t; Xijct are individual-level
controls (gender, age and wealth); δj are DHS cluster fixed effects; δc are cohort fixed effects;
and δt are DHS survey-year fixed effects. Variable exposurect stands for the yearly amount
per capita (at the country level) that the RBM has disbursed during a child’s lifetime, while
variable PfPR2000j captures malaria risk in DHS cluster j in 2000, hence prior to the RBM
campaign’s start date. The coefficient of the interaction term (exposurect × PfPR2000j),
denoted by β, should therefore capture the impact of RBM’s malaria control on educational
attainment.
Note that, for this to be the case, the start of RBM’s funding expansion should not
have been expected by those affected. If parents anticipated health improvements for their
children due to the campaign, they may have been more (or less) dedicated to investing in
their children’s education, even prior to the campaign’s start. Yet it would be difficult for
citizens to predict the creation of the major rollout of RBM campaigns, the Global Fund. The
Global Fund launched after a series of discussions between donors and multilateral agencies
that emerged toward the end of 1999. These discussions notably culminated with the sixth of
the eight Millennium Development Goals established following the Millennium Summit of the
United Nations in 2000: “To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.” The creation
of the Global Fund was therefore not a surprise for donor and multilateral agencies and the
limited community of their followers, but it is doubtful that this move was anticipated by
the general population of beneficiary countries. Moreover, it is only recently (2011) that this
major RBM actor started advertising its actions in developing countries.19 Hence, even in
countries where the Global Fund was not active until a few years after its creation (Sierra
18We focus on the three educational outcomes already presented in Section 2.3: grade level during the
current school year, total years of schooling completed and delay status for current grade level.
19This promotion is based on the green leaf logo of the Affordable Medicines Facility-malaria program
(AMFm). This logo is printed on anti-malaria treatments provided by the Global Fund and is notably
supposed to reflect price reductions through negotiations of the Global Fund with ACT manufacturers.
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Leone and Malawi), the start of anti-malaria campaigns is unlikely to have been anticipated
by potential beneficiaries.
Using a difference-in-differences analysis in this way is not new. Other notable studies
follow this strategy to analyze the effect of malaria control on various socioeconomic factors.
Bleakley (2010) focuses on the malaria control campaigns in the United States (1920) as well
as in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico (1950) in order to assess the impact of childhood exposure
to malaria on labor productivity. Cutler et al. (2010), Lucas (2010), and Venkataramani
(2012) estimate this impact on educational and/or cognitive outcomes in India, Paraguay
and Sri Lanka, and Mexico respectively. These studies establish an overall positive impact
of control campaigns. Our approach complements these efforts by incorporating detailed
contemporaneous data and focusing on control (rather than elimination) efforts.
3.2 Identifying assumptions
For coefficient β in Equation (3) to capture the causal impact of the RBM campaign on
educational achievements, the interaction term (exposurect×PfPR2000j) must be exogenous.
Yet, several factors may compromise such exogeneity. First, by definition, an individual’s
exposure to the RBM campaign depends on his or her age (i.e. the difference between
DHS survey year and the individual’s date of birth). As a consequence, a correlation exists
between (exposurect × PfPR2000j) and (agect × PfPR2000j). Yet, (agect × PfPR2000j) is likely
correlated with the dependent variable in Equation (3). The impact of pre-campaign malaria
risk on educational outcomes may thus vary across age. To avoid this omitted variable bias,
we include the interaction term (agect × PfPR2000j) in Equation (3).
Second, exposure to the RBM campaign may capture exposure to concomitant health
and education initiatives. To absorb the impact of such programs, we introduce in Equation
(3) an interaction term between the proportion of a child’s life that has elapsed since the
creation of the RBM in 199820 and PfPR2000j.
Third, pre-campaign malaria risk is likely related to pre-campaign educational outcomes
such that there is a correlation between (exposurect × PfPR2000j) and the interaction term
between exposurect and pre-campaign educational outcomes at the cluster level. Yet, the
20This proportion is equal to 1 for a child born after 1998; it is equal to (DHS survey year-1998-1)/(DHS
survey year-date of birth-1) for a child born before 1998.
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latter interaction term is also plausibly correlated with the dependent variable in Equation
(3): the impact of exposure to malaria control campaigns may vary depending on pre-
campaign educational outcomes. Initially more (resp. less) educated individuals are indeed
more (resp. less) likely to adopt anti-malaria strategies (see Nganda et al. (2004); Rhee et al.
(2005); Hwang et al. (2010); Graves et al. (2011).21 Unfortunately, due to data limitations,
we cannot control for the interaction term between exposurect and pre-campaign educational
outcomes at the cluster level. We control instead for the interaction term between exposurect
and region fixed effects in Equation (3).22
Fourth, an individual’s exposure to malaria control campaigns depends on his or her
date of birth,23 while pre-campaign malaria risk is correlated with local characteristics. Such
correlations are a source of endogeneity if there are trends in educational outcomes at the
local level, meaning that primary school students’ born in different years and localities were
initially exposed to different educational policies. To limit this endogeneity, we add an
interaction term between students’ date of birth and region fixed effects in Equation (3).24
Evidently, our additional controls cannot allow us to treat all sources of endogeneity in
Equation (3). Our proxy for pre-campaign malaria risk, PfPR in the year 2000 in DHS
cluster j, can be correlated to unobservables at the individual level within cluster j (like a
household’s readiness to adopt preventative strategies). It may also face attenuation bias
due to measurement error (if this error is classical).
To address these concerns, we instrument pre-campaign malaria risk with six different
sets of instrumental variables. These instruments must be such that they plausibly impact
educational outcomes only through their impact on malaria risk. They should have no direct
impact on educational outcomes, nor be correlated with any characteristics at the individual
level within a given cluster that might be correlated with educational outcomes. As, we
combine standard strategies with more novel instruments, we are hesitant to settle on a
first-best strategy. For transparency, we present results for all six sets of instruments.
21See also Kenkel (1991) and Dupas (2011) for the relationship between education and health behavior.
22We obviously cannot control for the interaction term between exposurect and cluster fixed effects since
this would drop the main variable of interest in our analysis, i.e. (exposurect × PfPR2000j).
23Indeed, everything else held constant, the later the date of birth, the higher the probability that the
child was exposed to Global Fund’s disbursements during his/her entire life.
24We focus on region rather than cluster fixed effects because educational policies are more likely to be
determined at the region rather than cluster level in case they are (at least partly) decentralized. Regardless,
an interaction term between cluster fixed effects and students’ date of birth would drop the main variable
of interest in our analysis, i.e. (exposurect × PfPR2000j).
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These six sets encompass: latitude, longitude, and altitude at the cluster level (Set I),
average temperature (annual mean temperature, maximum temperature of warmest month,
minimum temperature of coldest month), annual precipitation, altitude and their polynomi-
als (Sets II and III), frequency of G6PD deficiency and P. falciparum and basic reproductive
number under control (PfRc) (Set IV), malaria ecology provided by MAP (i.e. probability of
occurrence of Anopheles species that constitute dominant and secondary vectors of malaria
in a given country in a given year) (Set V), as well Kiszewski et al. (2004)’s malaria stability
index (Set VI).
Set I relies on geographic variables that have been strongly linked to malaria, that is, on
the latitude, longitude and altitude at the cluster level. (See for instance Burlando (2012)
for the use of altitude as an instrumental variable where higher altitudes are less malarious).
Latitude and longitude are provided by DHS surveys. Altitude captures average elevation
above sea level and is made available by the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM).25
Sets II and III of instruments are similar to those used by Bleakley (2010) and Cutler
et al. (2010) respectively. These instruments combine geographic and climatic variables.
Bleakley (2010) instruments average malaria risk with average temperature and average
altitude as well as the interaction of the two. We rely on the same instruments. Average
temperature is the annual mean temperature provided by WorldClim26 while average altitude
is defined as in Set I. Cutler et al. (2010) use average temperature, average altitude, average
humidity, average precipitation, and squared terms of all four variables as instruments. We
rely on similar instruments and their squared terms: average temperature (annual mean
temperature, maximum temperature of warmest month, minimum temperature of coldest
month) as well as annual precipitation from WorldClim and average altitude from SRTM.
Set IV includes frequency of G6PD deficiency and the P. falciparum basic reproductive
number under control (PfRc) at the DHS cluster level. We already described G6PD defi-
ciency in Section 2.2. The PfRc is computed by MAP similarly by using information from
the 1985-2010 period. The PfRc measures the potential for malaria to spread at the cluster
level if the population in this cluster is naive (i.e. not yet affected by malaria) and endowed
with its current level of malaria control (see Smith et al. (2007) and Gething et al. (2011).
25This database is available at http://www2.jpl.nasa.gov/srtm/.
26This database is available at http://www.worldclim.org/ and is representative of the period 1950-2000.
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The PfRc is a function of the human feeding rate, infectivity of mosquitoes to humans (and
vice versa), death rate of mosquitoes, number of mosquitoes per human, number of days
required for mosquito to complete sporogony, and expected waiting time to naturally clear
a simple infection (Smith et al. (2007)). The MAP protocol modify this formula to account
for heterogeneous biting behavior and existing control efforts. Therefore, by construction,
PfRc correlates well to PfPR2000j.
Sets V and VI use two different measures of malaria ecology that capture the geospatial
stability of malaria transmission. We compute the first measure from the MAP database.
Here, malaria ecology stands for the average, at the DHS cluster level, of the probability of
occurrence of Anopheles species that constitute dominant and secondary vectors of malaria in
a given country.27 The second measure of malaria ecology is the stability index of Kiszewski
et al. (2004). To generate a measure of malaria’s transmission, the authors interact malaria
vector behavior with climate characteristics. Several recent quasi-experimental studies rely
this index as an instrument (see Bleakley (2010), Lucas (2010) and Venkataramani (2012)).
While both indices are similar, MAP relies not only on environmental and climatic variables
to estimate vector occurrence, but also uses vector-specific population models that predict
how environmental and climatic factors impact the ecology and bionomics of each vector
species. Furthermore, the MAP index is estimated at a much more disaggregated level, with
grids of 1 km × 1 km resolution, while Kiszewski et al. (2004) rely on 55 km × 55 km grids
(see Sinka et al. (2010) and Sinka et al. (2012)). This offers higher precision and greater
cross-cluster variation.
3.3 Testing the parallel trend assumption
For coefficient β in Equation (3) to capture the causal impact of the RBM campaign on
educational achievements, it should not be the case that, prior to the RBM campaign,
health and educational outcomes of individuals in the treatment group (i.e. those living in
regions with higher pre-campaign malaria risk) already converge to those of individuals in the
27This approach for computing the ecology measure implies that different species must be taken into
account for each of our 14 countries: funestus, nili, gambiae, arabiensis for Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mali
and Namibia; funestus, nili, gambiae, arabiensis, moucheti for Rwanda and Uganda; funestus, nili, gambiae,
arabiensis, melas, moucheti for Cameroon and Nigeria; funestus, nili, arabiensis for Ethiopia; funestus, nili,
gambiae, arabiensis, melas for Ghana, Guinea and Senegal; funestus, nili, gambiae, arabiensis, moucheti,
merus for Kenya; funestus, nili, gambiae, arabiensis, merus for Zimbabwe.
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control group (i.e. those living in regions with lower pre-campaign malaria risk). Were such
catch-up effects at work prior to the campaign, we would not be able to disentangle whether
β measures the impact of the RBM campaign or merely the pursuit of this pre-campaign
trend.
To rule out the possibility of a pre-campaign catch-up effect, we perform a falsification
test. We estimate Equation (3) among individuals who had already left primary school when
RBM’s campaign began. More precisely, we define these individuals as those whose age is
above the maximum age among our primary school students when the campaign started (this
maximum age varies between 24 and 25). Measures of their health and educational outcomes
before the RBM campaign should therefore not be impacted by the campaign. More precisely,
finding a positive and significant β would suggest that catch-up effects between the treatment
and the control group were already at stake prior to the campaign.
We focus on two dependent variables. The first one is the weight-for-height percent of
reference median based on WHO reference standard for adult females. We use it as a proxy
for health conditions during the childhood of those adults who belong to our sample. The
second dependent variable is the years of education these adults completed when they were
enrolled at primary school.
Tables 4 and 5 provide OLS and IV estimates, respectively. As expected, coefficient β
is never robustly positive, except in Cameroon. Therefore, the results we obtain when we
estimate Equation (3) among primary school students in Cameroon will need to be taken
with caution since pre-campaign catch-up effects seem to be at work in this country.
4 Results
In this section, we first present OLS estimates of Equation (3). We then provide our 2-SLS
results. We conclude by performing robustness checks.
4.1 OLS estimates
As described in Section 2.3, there are several channels through which malaria control can
improve student’s educational attainment. However, by reducing the mortality of children
under the age of five, anti-malaria campaigns can also impose considerable strain on educa-
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tional resources if enrollment increases substantially. Moreover, if weaker students are more
likely to enroll thanks to malaria control programs, these students may also more likely to
fall behind. Thus, the impact of malaria control on schoolchildren’s educational attainment
is ambiguous ex-ante.
We present descriptive statistics of our main primary school student population in Table
6. Tables 7 through 9 present OLS estimates of coefficient β in Equation (3) where the
dependent variables are grade, years, and delay.28 Controls are added sequentially into
Equation (3): individual covariates (gender, age and wealth, and year of birth, DHS cluster
as well as DHS survey year fixed effects (column 1); the interaction term between regional
fixed effects and exposure (column 2); the interaction term between pre-campaign malaria
risk and student’s age (column 3); the interaction term between regional fixed effects and
student’s date of birth (column 4); and the interaction between the 1998 time trend and
pre-campaign malaria risk (column 5). In a majority of countries (13 of 14), malaria control
leads to statistically significant increases in grade and years and/or statistically significant
reductions in schooling delay (Cameroon is this exception). We now turn to an IV approach
to address the issues outlined in Section 3.2.
4.2 IV estimates
For a specific set of instruments, the first-stage of the 2SLS consists of regressing the in-
teraction term between exposure to RBM disbursements and PfPR in 2000 on interaction
terms composed of exposure and each of the instruments that belong to this set. Naturally,
all controls present in the second stage are also present in the first stage.
We provide results of an OLS estimation which regresses PfPR in 2000 on the various
sets of instrumental variables in Section S1 of the supplemental appendix. Tables S1-1 to
S1-14 reveal highly significant correlations between pre-campaign malaria risk and all three
sets of instruments. Moreover, Section S1 displays F-statistics that are, with rare exceptions,
greater than 10.
Results from the second stage of the 2-SLS approach, which relies on Equation (3), are
28Our objective is to measure the average marginal impact of exposure to the RBM anti-malaria campaigns,
that is the impact of exposure to RBM when explanatory variables in Equation (3) are set at their average.
When “delay” is the dependent variable, an OLS approach amounts to estimating a linear probability model
which provides similar marginal effects as would a probit or a logit analysis (see Angrist (2001)).
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reported in Tables 10 through 12. We also report the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) χ2 test
for each country. For the majority of cases, this test rejects the null hypothesis according to
which OLS and IV estimates are not significantly different from each other.
Figure 6 helps us to visualize our findings. For all countries, we display OLS results.
Plus and minus signs indicate the sign of coefficient β in Equation (3). A cell is highlighted
in grey if the coefficient is statistically significant and left blank otherwise. For each country,
we include the IV results only if the DWH test is rejected in at least 4 of the 6 IV sets. We
apply the same majority selection rule (4/6) to report both the sign and the significance in
each IV cell.
The DWH test indicates that the IV results must be trusted for at least one of our three
dependent variables, in each country of our sample. We conclude that, with the exception
of Guinea where the impact of the RBM campaign is not statistically significant based on
the 2-SLS estimates, the RBM campaign leads to significant increases in grade level and
years of schooling (9 countries) and/or reductions in schooling delay (13 countries). It is
worth emphasizing that the orders of magnitude are greater with the IV than with the OLS
approach. This indicates that our OLS estimates are possibly subject to an underestimation
bias, which is consistent with the various sources of endogeneity previously highlighted.
4.3 Robustness checks
4.3.1 Ruling out a migration effect
The variable PfPR2000j in Equation (3) captures pre-campaign malaria risk in the DHS clus-
ter where the respondent currently lives. There is no guarantee that this place of residence
coincides with the respondent’s place of birth (this information is absent from the DHS
surveys, as is the respondent’s migrant status).
Yet, it is unlikely that migration of primary schoolchildren from non-malarious to malar-
ious regions drives our results. Focusing on a youth population limits the time window
available for migration. Moreover, our results are consistent across countries that show dif-
ferent internal migration rates. For instance, we find a positive impact of the Global Fund’s
anti-malaria campaigns on educational attainment in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda, Sene-
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gal, Uganda and Zimbabwe, although lifetime crude internal migration intensity29 varies
substantially across these countries, from 10.4% in Rwanda to 28.9% in Zimbabwe (see
United Nations (2013)). Evidence further suggests that individuals prefer migrating to non-
malarious rather than to malarious regions (see Sachs and Malaney (2002) and Hong (2011)).
Notably, Sawyer (1993) shows that malarious regions in Brazil deter permanent migration. If
anything, they attract male temporary workers who do not migrate with their family. Note
that one might still worry about a selection bias whereby individuals (parents) with higher
levels of education will likely choose to live in areas that are the least conducive to malaria
risk and parents’ education is strongly correlated to their children’s education. Controlling
for the household’s wealth in Equation (3) helps us to proxy for parental education and
mitigate concerns about this selection bias.
Nevertheless, we replicate Equation (3) by restricting our analysis to heads of household
who report themselves to be permanent residents of their current location. This is an im-
perfect test because this information is not available for many countries and DHS rounds.
To proceed, we must confine our analysis to Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Namibia, and
Nigeria. OLS results, reported in Table S2-1, hold for all countries. IV results, reported
in Tables S2-2 to S2-4, hold for all countries except Kenya: in this country, coefficient β is
statistically significant (with the correct sign) for only one or two sets of IVs.
4.3.2 Relying on an alternative measure of pre-campaign malaria risk
We use an alternative measure for pre-campaign malaria risk. This measure comes from the
Mapping Malaria Risk in Africa/Atlas du Risque de la Malaria en Afrique (MARA/ARMA)
data. It represents the percentage of the population living in holo- and hyper-endemic areas
during the year prior to the start of the Global Fund’s disbursements in the regions of a
subsample (7) of our 14 countries.
Table S3-1 in the supplemental appendix present OLS estimates of coefficient β in Equa-
tion (3) when our PfPR measure is replaced by the MARA/ARMA measure (computed
at the regional level). OLS results hold for all countries except Senegal (and improve for
Cameroon). Tables S3-2 to S3-4 of the supplemental appendix present IV estimates. Over
the seven countries for which MARA/ARMA data are available, our IV results hold for all
29Crude internal migration is the proportion of internal migrants across regions in a country’s population.
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countries (and improve for Guinea).
5 Discussion
5.1 Educational cost-effectiveness
Our results reveal that, in 13 countries, the RBM malaria control campaigns positively affect
schooling attainment (in terms of years and grade level) and/or negatively affect delay. In
order to discuss the educational cost effectiveness of promoting school participation through
RBM rather than through alternative educational interventions, we provide the cost of an
additional year of school participation.
Let us consider Kenya, where the average primary student is 11.40 years-old in our
dataset and lives in an area impacted by P. falciparum malaria. If RBM introduced a yearly
per capita investment of $1 over the first 12.40 years of this student’s lifetime (taking in-
utero exposure into account), he/she would benefit from 2.93 additional years of schooling.30
Put differently, RBM-sponsored interventions of this kind increased school participation by
approximately 2.93 years for this student. The proportion of children enrolled in Kenya was
approximately 26.60% of the total population in 2000. Assuming that this figure is roughly
stable over the student’s lifetime, the cost of one additional year of school induced by RBM
is thus $ 15.90 (=12.40/[2.93 x 0.266]).
Estimates for our 14 countries are provided in Figure 7.31 The average cost per extra
year of school participation induced by the RBM is $ 13.19. Figure 7 adds the Abdul Latif
Jameel Poverty Action Lab’s (2005) summary of the cost-effectiveness of various programs
in increasing school participation (as reviewed by Kremer and Holla (2009)). We can thus
compare where our cost-effectiveness estimates fall within a wide range of other educational
interventions. For instance, Miguel and Kremer (2004) found that it costs approximately
$3.50 per additional year of school participation induced by a school-based mass treatment
30To get this order of magnitude, we first compute the average of coefficients β of Equation (3) for all
the IV strategies where these coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 11). This average is equal to
16.786. We then multiply this figure by the mean value of PfPR in 2000 which is equal to 0.175.
31Figure 7 is virtually unchanged when we rely on the proportion of children enrolled in primary school
over the 2000-2010 period rather than in 2000. We also note that, in our sample, the gross enrollment rate
is increasing by 13% on average between 2000 and 2010, which implies that our cost estimate, which focuses
on enrollment in 2000, is an upper bound.
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with deworming drugs. Five countries are below this threshold of $3.50 per additional year of
schooling attainment and 9 countries are above. Large-scale campaigns like RBM are likely
less efficient at increasing attainment compared to carefully controlled experiments, all the
more given that the most targeted populations are not school-age children. However, in all
countries, the RBM shows a lower cost than school uniforms or merit scholarship programs in
Kenya (Kremer, 2003; Kremer and Holla, 2009; Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2009). Thus,
even when compared to other educational interventions, RBM is a cost-effective method of
increasing years of schooling.
5.2 Heterogeneous effects
To the extent that RBM improves schooling, it is important to consider precisely who reaps
the benefits, with special consideration given to traditionally marginalized groups. For ex-
ample, if attainment increases for the relatively poorer segments of the population, RBM
spillovers contribute to a more equitable educational environment. Moreover, the RBM cam-
paigns may affect girls differentially to boys. Gender norms can influence malaria exposure
depending on who is more likely to be working in the fields at dusk or gathering water early
in the morning. Similarly, norms around decision-making and sleeping arrangements may
influence how households seek health care or determine who sleeps under mosquito nets.
Though we are not able to examine these questions in detail, we can observe whether our
schooling outcomes differ by gender.
In order to study heterogeneous effects, we introduce in Equation (3) an interaction term
to capture effects on enrollment for two groups: the relative poor and girls. More precisely,
we interact (exposurect×PfPR2000j) with an indicator that is equal to one if a respondent is
in the two poorest wealth quintiles (and zero otherwise) or an indicator for female. (Results
are available upon request.) Regarding underprivileged students, most countries exhibit no
differential treatment effects on attainment. Only in Nigeria and Rwanda do underprivileged
students benefit significantly less from RBM. If we turn our attention to gender imbalances,
it is notable that the enrollment and attainment gender gap was closing rapidly by 2000
(Schultz, 1999).32 Our descriptive statistics show no particular difference between boys and
32This catch-up can be attributed in large part to the increasing returns to educating females for occupa-
tions in agriculture and trade, rather than to improvements in health.
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girls for our variables of interest at baseline. Moreover, our test for heterogeneous treatment
effects by gender does not show a significant difference between boys and girls, though our
IV coefficients tend to be more frequently negative for females.
Finally, we note that by reducing mortality and increasing returns to education, large
health campaigns can also spur enrollment. By estimating Equation (3) on the probability
for an individual of primary school age to be enrolled in primary school, we can provide
some suggestive evidence on changes to the student body with respect to RBM. Moreover,
because less privileged children typically perform worse in school (Glewwe, Kremer and
Moulin, 2009), the campaign’s effects on attainment may constitute a lower bound if a
greater number of such students are enrolling in school. In all countries except Senegal,
exposure to the RBM increases a student’s probability of enrollment. (Results are available
upon request.) When we introduce indicators for wealth and gender, differential effects
emerge. In 7 countries (Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and Zimbabwe)
poorer students are less likely to enroll relative to wealthier students, and in 8 countries
(Cameroon, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, Uganda and Zimbabwe) girls are less
likely to enroll relative to boys. Thus, in these countries, traditionally marginalized groups
are less likely to enroll thanks to RBM but, once they are enrolled, differences in attainment
virtually disappear.
6 Conclusion
We document the effects of the RBM malaria control campaigns on primary school attain-
ment in Sub-Saharan Africa using microeconomic data from 14 countries. Consistent with
other geographically-specific studies analyzing the effects of large-scale health interventions
and policies, we find a positive impact on education (Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney, 2009;
Bleakley, 2010; Cutler et al., 2010; Lucas, 2010; Venkataramani, 2012). We show that school-
age children, 26% of the population in Africa,33 strongly benefit in terms of higher grade
levels and/or reduced delays in primary school progression. Moreover, at $ 13.19 per each
additional year of schooling on average, RBM appears to be highly cost-effective on relative
to standard educational interventions (Kremer, 2003; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Kremer and
33This figure comes from 2013 UN Population Division data.
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Holla, 2009; Kremer, Miguel and Thornton, 2009).
Our findings point to the importance of considering educational outcomes in addition to
health when investing in and evaluating large-scale health interventions. Mass interventions
can help to break inter-generational health-based poverty traps in which poor early child-
hood health impedes school participation and performance, lowers labor participation and
earnings, and increases the need for health care.
Documenting spillover effects of such interventions is not a trivial exercise given the
difficulty in estimating the medium-term effectiveness of programs aiming to reduce but
not eliminate health challenges (Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Ashraf, Fink and Weil, 2014).
Certainly the educational benefits from malaria intervention will never be large enough to
compete for attention with the direct health benefits (Jamison et al., 2013), but they may
be able to compete with standard educational programs.
Our results do face some limitations. While we provide evidence that our effects may be
persistent, a more general analysis of the long-run, general equilibrium impacts induced by
RBM is left for further investigation. For example, population increases thanks to health
interventions may put pressure on social service provision. Similarly, how the labor market
reacts to rightward shifts in human capital has important implications for economic produc-
tivity and growth. Therefore, observing the net effect of the RBM on GDP per capita will
take time to come to fruition, and our understanding is limited to the transitory phase.
Nonetheless, we believe our analysis can inform the debate on the impact of exogenous,
large-scale health shocks in developing countries. Some question if policy-makers can pro-
mote education and economic development via public healthcare interventions (see Acemoglu
and Johnson (2007, 2014) for a discussion). We provide evidence that, at least in the case
of malaria control efforts, improving education is a reality.
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7 Figures & tables
Figure 1: DHS survey rounds, RBM campaign’s start date and average yearly per capita
disbursements
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Figure 2: Cumulative probability of dying from malaria for children under five over all
Sub-Saharan countries
Note: We obtain data on the cumulative probability of dying from malaria (for children under five) from Institute for
Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME).
Figure 3: Evolution of PfPR (Plasmodium falciparum parasite rate) in our sample
Note: The line plots the mean PfPR taken over all 14 countries from our DHS sample against time. We obtain yearly PfPR
from the Malaria Atlas Project. In a regression of the change in PfPR between 2000 and 2002 on a constant, the coefficient
on the constant is 0.008 and is not statistically significant (N = 120). For the change in PfPR between 2003 and 2005, the
coefficient on the constant is -0.047 and is statistically significant at 0.1% (N = 120). For the change in PfPR between 2003
and 2012, the coefficient on the constant is -0.104 and is statistically significant at 0.1% (N = 120). Note that the turning
point is also similar to Figure 1.
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Figures 4a-4c: Evolution of PfPR at the regional level conditional on initial PfPR
Note: Each point represents a DHS region. We obtain yearly PfPR from the Malaria Atlas Project. In a univariate
regression of the change in PfPR between 2000 and 2002 on the initial PfPR in 2000, the coefficient on initial PfPR is -0.014
and is not statistically significant (Figure 4a, N = 120). For the change in PfPR between 2003 and 2005, the coefficient on
initial PfPR is -0.140 and is statistically significant at 0.1% (Figure 4b, N = 120). For the change in PfPR between 2003 and
2012, the coefficient on initial PfPR is -0.318 and is statistically significant at 0.1% (Figure 4c, N = 120).
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Figures 5a-5c: Evolution of bednet and chloroquine use over time conditional on initial
PfPR
Note: Each point represents a DHS region. We obtain yearly PfPR from the Malaria Atlas Project. In a univariate
regression of the change in bednet use between the most recent and earliest surveys on initial PfPR in 2000, the coefficient on
initial PfPR is 0.312 and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level (Figure 5a, N = 93). For the change in chloroquine use,
the coefficient on initial PfPR is -0.279 and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level (Figure 5b, N = 37). For the change
in chloroquine use during pregnancy, the coefficient on initial PfPR is -0.373 and is statistically significant at the 0.1% level
(Figure 5c, N = 77).
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Figure 6: Summary of results
Note: Plus and minus signs indicate the sign of coefficient β in Equation (3). A cell is highlighted in grey if the coefficient
is statistically significant and left blank otherwise. For each country, we include the IV results only if the DWH test is rejected
in at least 4 of the 6 IV sets. We apply the same majority selection rule (4/6) to report both the sign and the significance
in each IV cell. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe are valid in 6/6
or 5/6 for all dependent variables. Malawi, Rwanda, and Uganda are valid in 6/6 or 5/6 for delay only. Finally, Guinea is
borderline for all dependent variables with 3/6 valid estimations.
Figure 7: Educational cost-effectiveness (cost of an additional year of schooling)
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Table 1: Impact of malaria on health and education
Fever Fever Dead Dead Grade Grade Years Years Delay Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PfPR*G6PD*Rainy 0.097* 0.065***
(0.034) (0.015)
Lag PfPR*G6PD*Rainy 0.096* 0.103***
(0.037) (0.014)
PfPR*G6PD -0.175* -0.157* 0.091***
(0.074) (0.077) (0.018)
Lag PfPR*G6PD -0.033 -0.213* 0.064***
(0.074) (0.077) (0.018)
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Individual covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.071 0.071 0.503 0.504 0.601 0.601 0.603 0.603 0.434 0.434
Observations 263,340 263,340 308,537 308,537 336,691 336,691 336,627 336,627 336,691 336,691
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest Equation (1). The unit of observation is the individual. Estimates include fixed effects for region, year
of birth, and survey year and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 2: Impact of malaria on health and education depending on initial level of malaria
risk (in 2000)
Fever Dead Grade Years Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PfPR*Time*Rainy -0.140* -0.063***
(0.048) (0.015)
PfPR*Time 0.201* 0.228* -0.036*
(0.071) (0.073) (0.017)
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth FE yes yes yes yes yes
Region * Survey year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Individual covariates yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.075 0.497 0.607 0.609 0.443
Observations 220,342 258,926 281,866 281,819 281,866
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (2). The unit of observa-
tion is the individual. Estimates include fixed effects for region, year of birth, and region-by-
survey year and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1
and 0.1% levels.
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Table 3: Impact of malaria on fertility
Ideal Ideal Live births Live births Alive Alive Ideal Live births Alive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
PfPR*G6PD 0.070* 0.014 -0.008
(0.024) (0.025) (0.023)
Lag PfPR*G6PD 0.120*** 0.017 -0.003
(0.027) (0.025) (0.023)
PfPR*Time -0.034ˆ -0.015 0.025
(0.020) (0.023) (0.021)
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year of birth FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Survey year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no
Region * Survey year FE no no no no no no yes yes yes
Individual covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.261 0.261 0.631 0.631 0.582 0.582 0.287 0.633 0.585
Observations 342,343 342,343 371,438 371,438 371,438 371,438 287,638 313,507 313,507
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (2) (columns 1-6) and Equation (1) (columns 5-10). The unit of observation is an
adult woman. The dependent variables are the logarithm of one plus the ideal number of children, the total number of live births, and the number
of children alive, respectively. Estimates in columns 1 to 6 include fixed effects for region, year of birth, and survey year and individual covariates
(age, gender, wealth). Estimates in columns 7 to 9 include fixed effects for region, year of birth, and region-by-survey year and individual covariates.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 4: Testing the parallel trend assumption: OLS estimates for female
weight-for-height and adult years of education completed
Weight-for-height Years of education completed Weight-for-height Years of education completed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Burkina Faso -1.89e+04 -16.313ˆ Mali 43664.925 -12.900*
(38519.934) (9.776) (29619.143) (3.963)
R2 0.345 0.363 R2 0.283 0.323
Observations 9,678 39,573 Observations 15,892 59,021
Cameroon 4565.781 54.718*** Namibia -2.86e+05 -99.140
(52394.059) (9.489) (5.62e+05) (97.951)
R2 0.409 0.623 R2 0.289 0.419
Observations 5,153 36,199 Observations 4,532 28,325
Ethiopia -4.90e+04 0.730 Nigeria -5.77e+04 -19.786
(1.12e+05) (59.424) (71485.899) (24.306)
R2 0.323 0.524 R2 0.245 0.564
Observations 17,504 66,223 Observations 18,266 60,201
Ghana 20862.549 -50.681*** Rwanda 7716.871 5.930
(77824.974) (15.346) (21558.089) (4.971)
R2 0.404 0.524 R2 0.307 0.336
Observations 5,095 24,289 Observations 5080 27993
Guinea 27431.176 7.258 Senegal -6.32e+04 -14.115ˆ
(71106.720) (11.306) (54636.733) (7.779)
R2 0.330 0.328 R2 0.335 0.386
Observations 3,538 24,237 Observations 3,764 38,760
Kenya -7.65e+04 -25.170 Uganda -5.95e+04ˆ 1.889
(59388.463) (17.274) (31472.723) (6.807)
R2 0.357 0.581 R2 0.375 0.444
Observations 7,090 23,189 Observations 5,959 31,268
Malawi -1.08e+04 -6.040* Zimbabwe -1.18e+05 -70.600
(8649.222) (3.015) (2.63e+05) (108.224)
R2 0.189 0.404 R2 0.242 0.475
Observations 19,835 79,814 Observations 10,070 34,349
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is an adult woman (column 1) and an adult (column 2). All estimates
include fixed effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as exposure-by-region, age-by-PfPR, cohort-by-region, exposure since 1998-by-PfPR, and individual
covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and
0.1% levels.
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Table 5: Testing the parallel trend assumption: IV estimates for female weight/height and adult years of education completed
Weight/height Years of education completed
Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Burkina Faso -4177.799 15744.877 16214.081 -3.45e+04 27949.440 22872.301 -25.302 -36.371* -27.837ˆ -94.001*** -30.755ˆ -18.620
(53861.254) (53256.653) (50726.628) (54908.077) (53247.291) (54301.550) (15.808) (15.435) (14.904) (17.324) (15.803) (15.543)
R2 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.363 0.363 0.363 0.361 0.363 0.363
Observations 9,678 9,678 9,678 9,678 9,678 9,678 39,573 39,573 39,573 39,573 39,573 39,573
Cameroon 2.01e+05* 1.34e+05 1.25e+05 30776.102 98967.658 -5.74e+04 59.640* 65.558*** 49.734* 68.688*** 65.061* 57.092*
(93679.346) (88485.474) (82931.948) (89697.195) (1.11e+05) (1.69e+05) (18.763) (18.280) (17.018) (19.244) (20.461) (26.216)
R2 0.407 0.408 0.408 0.409 0.409 0.409 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623 0.623
Observations 5,144 5,144 5,144 5,147 5,153 5,153 36,134 36,134 36,134 36,153 36,199 36,199
Ethiopia 6.98e+05* 5.66e+05* 3.46e+05ˆ 4.32e+05ˆ 6.54e+05* 0.000 75.330 82.830 26.239 126.501 172.542 0.000
(2.53e+05) (2.35e+05) (1.77e+05) (2.21e+05) (2.82e+05) (1.92e+05) (134.810) (128.591) (99.728) (126.217) (158.930) (99.757)
R2 0.321 0.321 0.322 0.289 0.321 0.323 0.524 0.524 0.524 0.470 0.524 0.524
Observations 17,504 17,504 17,504 14,179 17,504 17,504 66,223 66,223 66,223 53,681 66,223 66,223
Ghana 2926.190 5428.436 -5244.998 69235.820 -1.08e+04 7953.570 -61.619* -64.799* -63.115* -85.086*** -58.967ˆ -82.312*
(1.48e+05) (1.51e+05) (1.33e+05) (1.52e+05) (1.67e+05) (1.52e+05) (23.750) (23.681) (22.384) (24.653) (34.432) (30.433)
R2 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.523 0.524 0.524
Observations 5,071 5,071 5,071 5,088 5,095 5,095 24,165 24,165 24,165 24,267 24,289 24,289
Guinea -5814.965 -1.11e+04 -3.51e+04 -1.54e+05 -4.28e+04 84882.017 40.199* 31.976ˆ 36.172* 25.482 22.176 15.001
(1.19e+05) (1.18e+05) (1.13e+05) (1.36e+05) (1.30e+05) (1.56e+05) (18.657) (18.029) (17.906) (21.657) (26.790) (32.988)
R2 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.326 0.330 0.330 0.325 0.326 0.326 0.324 0.328 0.328
Observations 3,497 3,497 3,497 3,525 3,538 3,538 24,010 24,010 24,010 24,157 24,237 24,237
Kenya 2.64e+05 3.73e+05 34997.254 -8.25e+04 2.53e+05 0.000 -364.365* -373.019* -116.651ˆ 31.972 26.360 -615.262
(3.77e+05) (3.86e+05) (2.83e+05) (2.93e+05) (4.37e+05) (2.38e+05) (131.950) (134.104) (65.865) (67.071) (144.200) (868.119)
R2 0.355 0.353 0.358 0.359 0.354 0.357 0.570 0.570 0.581 0.574 0.581 0.546
Observations 7,049 7,049 7,049 5,563 7,090 7,090 23,056 23,056 23,056 18,116 23,189 23,189
Malawi -1.93e+04 -1.82e+04 -1.21e+04 -7931.348 -1.71e+04 -1.17e+04 1.858 1.110 -6.026 0.604 -3.528 -10.728
(13628.887) (13447.776) (11106.896) (12721.689) (13697.057) (15713.317) (5.119) (5.001) (4.172) (5.065) (5.380) (6.949)
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R2 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.189 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404 0.404
Observations 19,835 19,835 19,835 19,835 19,835 19,835 79,814 79,814 79,814 79,814 79,814 79,814
Mali 1.07e+05* 95768.868ˆ 64346.482ˆ 44190.500 73445.468 76345.130 -19.011* -18.147* -13.872ˆ -18.445* -17.635* -20.422*
(52984.524) (53719.478) (39078.896) (34154.023) (52787.494) (57137.179) (9.244) (9.250) (7.453) (6.140) (8.899) (10.101)
R2 0.282 0.283 0.283 0.281 0.283 0.283 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323 0.323
Observations 15,892 15,892 15,892 15,648 15,892 15,892 59,021 59,021 59,021 58,248 59,021 59,021
Namibia -8.62e+05 -6.38e+05 -6.37e+05 0.000 0.000 0.000 -318.663* -261.122ˆ -261.660ˆ -304.009ˆ -337.588* -487.958*
(9.60e+05) (9.55e+05) (9.25e+05) (2.59e+05) (2.84e+05) (2.84e+05) (148.736) (147.091) (141.853) (163.204) (171.241) (213.771)
R2 0.290 0.290 0.290 0.284 0.289 0.289 0.416 0.416 0.416 0.417 0.419 0.418
Observations 4,502 4,502 4,502 2,892 4,532 4,532 27,836 27,836 27,836 16,461 28,325 28,325
Nigeria 40713.450 -8.86e+04 -1.47e+05 -6.34e+05* -2.02e+05 1.85e+05 14.087 -12.756 -3.846 110.009 7.138 -52.698
(1.71e+05) (1.52e+05) (1.45e+05) (2.21e+05) (1.70e+05) (2.49e+05) (59.403) (48.955) (45.162) (67.829) (50.860) (64.195)
R2 0.244 0.245 0.245 0.242 0.244 0.244 0.564 0.564 0.564 0.563 0.564 0.564
Observations 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 18,266 60,201 60,201 60,201 60,201 60,201 60,201
Rwanda 82635.477 81549.251 48769.811 59207.342 86788.963 1.63e+05 -6.706 -7.149 1.848 -10.583 -5.909 20.756
(50388.987) (51687.037) (45248.697) (47397.604) (62827.360) (1.27e+05) (8.545) (8.632) (7.399) (8.387) (11.941) (41.162)
R2 0.304 0.304 0.306 0.313 0.303 0.292 0.336 0.336 0.336 0.333 0.336 0.336
Observations 5,080 5,080 5,080 4,092 5,080 5,080 27,993 27,993 27,993 22,427 27,993 27,993
Senegal 71482.807 69111.334 15878.358 60413.445 -7.18e+04 38386.154 -68.243* -71.467* -74.010*** -74.138* -77.534* -107.993*
(1.39e+05) (1.38e+05) (1.20e+05) (1.37e+05) (1.46e+05) (1.74e+05) (26.930) (26.815) (20.762) (25.052) (25.876) (36.486)
R2 0.330 0.331 0.331 0.333 0.335 0.334 0.385 0.385 0.385 0.384 0.384 0.381
Observations 3,724 3,724 3,724 3,764 3,764 3,764 38,457 38,457 38,457 38,760 38,760 38,760
Uganda -1.19e+05ˆ -6.85e+04 -1.12e+05* -1.67e+04 -4.86e+04 -1.69e+05* -33.413* -15.326 -14.506 -28.686ˆ -4.840 -42.704ˆ
(72226.191) (67152.261) (51093.840) (80686.906) (1.23e+05) (79314.798) (15.224) (14.809) (13.626) (14.733) (19.154) (21.946)
R2 0.375 0.375 0.375 0.383 0.375 0.373 0.443 0.444 0.444 0.445 0.444 0.443
Observations 5,959 5,959 5,959 5,613 5,959 5,959 31,268 31,268 31,268 30,072 31,268 31,268
Zimbabwe -3.49e+05 -4.46e+05 -3.91e+05 -5.88e+05 -2.43e+06ˆ 15991.137 478.868 348.717 114.517 27.848 -985.783* 634.836*
(7.60e+05) (7.11e+05) (4.97e+05) (4.68e+05) (1.32e+06) (6.35e+05) (303.281) (284.559) (203.530) (317.195) (424.064) (280.540)
R2 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.237 0.242 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.475 0.473 0.474
Observations 10,070 10,070 10,070 9,996 10,070 10,070 34,349 34,349 34,349 34,112 34,349 34,349
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is an adult woman (columns 1-6) and an adult (columns 7-12). All estimates include fixed effects for year of birth,
DHS cluster, and survey year as well as exposure-by-region, age-by-PfPR, cohort-by-region, exposure since 1998-by-PfPR and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). All columns control for: . Standard
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Obs. Min Max Mean SD Obs. Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Burkina Faso Grade 3.31 1.69 16,178 0.00 6.00 Mali Grade 3.28 1.67 22,256 0.00 6.00
Years 2.82 1.75 16,177 0.00 6.00 Years 2.38 1.69 22,246 0.00 13.00
Delay 0.37 0.48 16,178. 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.37 0.48 22,256 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.35 0.26 16,180 0.00 0.87 Exposure to RBM 0.37 0.50 22,260 0.00 1.63
PfPr in 2000 0.63 0.18 904 0.10 0.94 PfPr in 2000 0.31 0.19 1,152 0.04 0.84
Male 0.54 0.50 16,179 0.00 1.00 Male 0.55 0.50 22,258 0.00 1.00
Age 10.20 2.61 16,180 5.00 24.00 Age 9.88 2.72 22,260 5.00 24.00
Wealth 3.45 1.36 16,180 1.00 5.00 Wealth 3.43 1.41 22,260 1.00 5.00
Cameroon Grade 3.27 1.75 26,682 0.00 7.00 Namibia Grade 3.90 1.98 14,992 0.00 8.00
Years 2.33 1.76 26,681 0.00 12.00 Years 3.03 2.00 14,985 0.00 15.00
Delay 0.39 0.49 26,682 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.30 0.46 14,992 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.32 0.30 26,685 0.00 1.06 Exposure to RBM 0.22 0.23 14,995 0.00 0.84
PfPr in 2000 0.42 0.23 1,033 0.04 0.89 PfPr in 2000 0.06 0.02 722 0.03 0.13
Male 0.53 0.50 26,677 0.00 1.00 Male 0.50 0.50 14,993 0.00 1.00
Age 9.54 3.12 26,685 3.00 24.00 Age 10.58 2.93 14,995 3.00 24.00
Wealth 2.92 1.31 26,685 1.00 5.00 Wealth 2.85 1.39 14,995 1.00 5.00
Ethiopia Grade 3.28 2.00 33,546 0.00 8.00 Nigeria Grade 3.19 1.65 55,978 0.00 6.00
Years 2.35 2.01 33,548 0.00 8.00 Years 2.26 1.67 55,968 0.00 12.00
Delay 0.43 0.50 33,546 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.41 0.49 55,978 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.21 0.21 33,553 0.00 0.75 Exposure to RBM 0.10 0.06 28,898 0.00 0.21
PfPr in 2000 0.05 0.03 1,581 0.01 0.31 PfPr in 2000 0.45 0.27 2,057 0.02 0.98
Male 0.53 0.50 33,553 0.00 1.00 Male 0.53 0.50 55,975 0.00 1.00
Age 11.98 3.72 33,553 5.00 24.00 Age 9.43 2.83 55,982 5.00 24.00
Wealth 3.30 1.50 33,553 1.00 5.00 Wealth 3.11 1.29 55,982 1.00 5.00
Ghana Grade 3.27 1.67 13,043 0.00 10.00 Rwanda Grade 2.78 1.62 24,921 0.00 8.00
Years 2.32 1.68 13,043 0.00 7.00 Years 2.15 1.70 24,887 0.00 10.00
Delay 0.39 0.49 13,043 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.50 0.50 24,921 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.21 0.17 13,044 0.00 0.79 Exposure to RBM 1.07 0.95 24,922 0.05 4.03
PfPr in 2000 0.57 0.23 804 0.09 0.92 PfPr in 2000 0.22 0.13 961 0.06 0.59
Male 0.52 0.50 13,044 0.00 1.00 Male 0.50 0.50 24,922 0.00 1.00
Age 10.21 2.87 13,044 3.00 24.00 Age 11.17 3.16 24,922 3.00 24.00
Wealth 2.70 1.39 13,044 1.00 5.00 Wealth 3.05 1.41 24,922 1.00 5.00
Guinea Grade 2.82 1.69 12,623 0.00 6.00 Senegal Grade 3.24 1.71 20,983 0.00 6.00
Years 2.36 1.67 12,623 0.00 15.00 Years 2.30 1.72 20,978 0.00 12.00
Delay 0.48 0.50 12,623 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.40 0.49 20,983 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.34 0.28 12,624 0.02 1.32 Exposure to RBM 0.63 0.63 20,992 0.01 1.94
PfPr in 2000 0.33 0.18 583 0.09 0.81 PfPr in 2000 0.20 0.12 742 0.05 0.64
Male 0.55 0.50 12,624 0.00 1.00 Male 0.50 0.50 20,992 0.00 1.00
Age 10.52 2.94 12,624 3.00 24.00 Age 10.17 2.91 20,992 5.00 24.00
Wealth 3.42 1.33 12,624 1.00 5.00 Wealth 2.73 1.29 20,992 1.00 5.00
Kenya Grade 4.13 2.29 18,671 0.00 11.00 Uganda Grade 3.28 1.90 35,240 0.00 7.00
Years 3.48 2.34 18,669 0.00 12.00 Years 2.44 1.92 35,236 0.00 12.00
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Delay 0.30 0.46 18,671 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.41 0.49 35,240 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.21 0.22 18,672 0.00 1.03 Exposure to RBM 0.40 0.40 35,256 0.00 1.53
PfPr in 2000 0.18 0.19 790 0.02 0.79 PfPr in 2000 0.50 0.23 1,002 0.08 0.86
Male 0.52 0.50 18,672 0.00 1.00 Male 0.51 0.50 35,256 0.00 1.00
Age 11.41 3.39 18,672 4.00 24.00 Age 10.78 3.23 35,256 3.00 24.00
Wealth 2.86 1.38 18,672 1.00 5.00 Wealth 3.06 1.42 35,256 1.00 5.00
Malawi Grade 3.41 2.15 69,895 0.00 8.00 Zimbabwe Grade 3.82 2.00 24,223 0.00 7.00
Years 2.77 2.17 69,887 0.00 12.00 Years 3.00 2.05 24,215 0.00 13.00
Delay 0.42 0.49 69,895 0.00 1.00 Delay 0.32 0.47 24,223 0.00 1.00
Exposure to RBM 0.45 0.47 69,898 0.00 1.52 Exposure to RBM 0.19 0.23 24,225 0.00 0.88
PfPr in 2000 0.32 0.14 1,919 0.08 0.76 PfPr in 2000 0.02 0.02 1,018 0.01 0.24
Male 0.51 0.50 69,898 0.00 1.00 Male 0.51 0.50 24,225 0.00 1.00
Age 10.80 3.49 69,898 5.00 24.00 Age 9.91 2.51 24,225 3.00 24.00
Wealth 3.04 1.39 69,898 1.00 5.00 Wealth 2.67 1.37 24,225 1.00 5.00
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Table 7: Impact of RBM’s anti-malaria campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: OLS estimates for grade
Grade Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Burkina Faso 2.501*** 11.835*** 17.745*** 22.966*** 28.330*** Mali 0.535 2.191* 2.616*** 3.130*** 4.479***
(0.749) (1.298) (1.450) (1.592) (2.365) (0.360) (0.718) (0.784) (0.888) (1.043)
R2 0.668 0.677 0.681 0.687 0.687 R2 0.642 0.644 0.644 0.645 0.645
Observations 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 Observations 22,208 22,208 22,208 22,208 22,208
Cameroon 0.509 5.330*** 6.082*** 5.871*** 1.542 Namibia 51.227*** 54.239*** 42.139* 29.152ˆ 19.528
(0.341) (0.586) (0.625) (0.765) (0.978) (6.700) (14.628) (15.578) (17.123) (17.225)
R2 0.660 0.665 0.665 0.668 0.669 R2 0.722 0.725 0.725 0.728 0.731
Observations 26,618 26,618 26,618 26,618 26,618 Observations 14,838 14,838 14,838 14,838 14,838
Ethiopia 15.652* 12.344* 35.569*** 16.701* 18.363* Nigeria 2.508* 8.471*** 20.886*** 21.206*** 25.685***
(4.753) (6.197) (7.315) (8.497) (8.064) (1.240) (1.396) (1.957) (2.189) (2.900)
R2 0.545 0.551 0.551 0.553 0.553 R2 0.533 0.537 0.539 0.541 0.541
Observations 32,802 32,802 32,802 32,802 32,802 Observations 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837
Ghana 9.306*** 8.211*** 11.177*** 13.525*** 15.187*** Rwanda 0.703*** 0.612* 0.295 0.313 0.667
(0.891) (1.204) (1.313) (1.510) (1.821) (0.154) (0.279) (0.324) (0.346) (0.496)
R2 0.599 0.602 0.603 0.606 0.606 R2 0.670 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.671
Observations 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,801 24,801 24,801 24,801 24,801
Guinea 2.080*** 2.355* 3.951* 5.903*** 6.051* Senegal 2.805*** 2.017*** 1.792* 1.607* 4.258***
(0.618) (1.081) (1.216) (1.536) (2.042) (0.384) (0.548) (0.651) (0.685) (1.047)
R2 0.618 0.618 0.618 0.619 0.619 R2 0.624 0.627 0.627 0.630 0.630
Observations 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,575 20,575 20,575 20,575 20,575
Kenya 3.597*** 1.780 0.018 2.227 2.566 Uganda 1.074*** 0.154 0.617 1.034* 0.618
(0.666) (1.212) (1.353) (1.589) (1.644) (0.258) (0.349) (0.427) (0.460) (0.497)
R2 0.724 0.730 0.730 0.731 0.731 R2 0.699 0.702 0.702 0.703 0.703
Observations 18,557 18,557 18,557 18,557 18,557 Observations 32,746 32,746 32,746 32,746 32,746
Malawi 0.861*** 0.227 -0.436 -0.078 0.179 Zimbabwe 50.513*** 46.770*** 12.922 11.880 16.748
(0.208) (0.240) (0.312) (0.346) (0.381) (10.448) (11.788) (15.396) (15.538) (15.137)
R2 0.703 0.704 0.704 0.704 0.704 R2 0.762 0.762 0.763 0.765 0.765
Observations 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 Observations 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759
Exposure*Region FE no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Age*PfPR no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Year of birth*Region FE no no no yes yes no no no yes yes
Exposure from 1998*PfPR no no no no yes no no no no yes
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Grade” stands for
grade level during the year when the interview is conducted. All estimates include fixed effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as individual covariates (age,
gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
47
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.75R (Version révisée)
Table 8: Impact of RBM’s anti-malaria campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: OLS estimates for years
Years Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Burkina Faso 2.503* 11.573*** 17.530*** 22.464*** 27.849*** Mali 0.623ˆ 2.052* 2.605*** 3.297*** 4.204***
(0.771) (1.335) (1.468) (1.607) (2.406) (0.359) (0.715) (0.788) (0.899) (1.077)
R2 0.682 0.690 0.695 0.700 0.700 R2 0.640 0.642 0.642 0.643 0.643
Observations 15,447 15,447 15,447 15,447 15,447 Observations 22,198 22,198 22,198 22,198 22,198
Cameroon 0.343 5.100*** 5.877*** 5.347*** 1.049 Namibia 48.359*** 52.041*** 41.718* 30.603ˆ 21.433
(0.331) (0.569) (0.608) (0.766) (1.005) (6.507) (14.150) (15.017) (16.563) (16.638)
R2 0.661 0.666 0.666 0.669 0.670 R2 0.718 0.721 0.721 0.724 0.726
Observations 26,617 26,617 26,617 26,617 26,617 Observations 14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831
Ethiopia 15.593* 11.944ˆ 34.625*** 14.918ˆ 16.546* Nigeria 2.680* 8.402*** 19.620*** 19.048*** 23.168***
(4.752) (6.179) (7.308) (8.484) (8.033) (1.293) (1.436) (2.078) (2.264) (2.987)
R2 0.547 0.552 0.553 0.554 0.555 R2 0.548 0.551 0.553 0.554 0.554
Observations 32,804 32,804 32,804 32,804 32,804 Observations 28,831 28,831 28,831 28,831 28,831
Ghana 9.329*** 8.217*** 11.197*** 13.476*** 15.042*** Rwanda 0.677*** 0.633* 0.259 0.427 0.622
(0.884) (1.202) (1.316) (1.498) (1.829) (0.161) (0.305) (0.348) (0.376) (0.525)
R2 0.606 0.609 0.610 0.613 0.613 R2 0.691 0.692 0.692 0.692 0.692
Observations 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,777 24,777 24,777 24,777 24,777
Guinea 2.821*** 3.051* 4.914*** 6.876*** 7.625*** Senegal 2.687*** 1.930*** 1.705* 1.153 3.303*
(0.570) (1.076) (1.199) (1.503) (1.996) (0.394) (0.564) (0.665) (0.702) (1.055)
R2 0.617 0.617 0.617 0.618 0.618 R2 0.625 0.628 0.628 0.631 0.631
Observations 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,570 20,570 20,570 20,570 20,570
Kenya 3.350*** 1.097 -0.856 1.409 1.726 Uganda 1.047*** 0.109 0.400 1.159* 0.637
(0.663) (1.198) (1.335) (1.562) (1.633) (0.264) (0.356) (0.446) (0.472) (0.514)
R2 0.733 0.738 0.739 0.740 0.740 R2 0.705 0.708 0.708 0.709 0.709
Observations 18,555 18,555 18,555 18,555 18,555 Observations 32,742 32,742 32,742 32,742 32,742
Malawi 0.807*** 0.107 -0.827* -0.324 -0.173 Zimbabwe 48.810*** 46.299* 12.880 13.403 18.230
(0.220) (0.255) (0.329) (0.364) (0.395) (14.483) (15.873) (18.140) (18.342) (18.421)
R2 0.705 0.705 0.705 0.706 0.706 R2 0.766 0.767 0.767 0.769 0.769
Observations 68,987 68,987 68,987 68,987 68,987 Observations 23,751 23,751 23,751 23,751 23,751
Exposure*Region FE no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Age*PfPR no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Year of birth*Region FE no no no yes yes no no no yes yes
Exposure from 1998*PfPR no no no no yes no no no no yes
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Years” stands for the
total years of schooling. All estimates include fixed effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 9: Impact of RBM’s anti-malaria campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: OLS estimates for delay
Delay Delay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Burkina Faso -0.462* -2.832*** -4.319*** -5.715*** -5.973*** Mali -0.010 -0.675*** -0.788*** -0.948*** -1.812***
(0.210) (0.337) (0.345) (0.370) (0.547) (0.103) (0.199) (0.221) (0.260) (0.299)
R2 0.555 0.564 0.567 0.573 0.573 R2 0.508 0.510 0.510 0.511 0.512
Observations 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 Observations 22,208 22,208 22,208 22,208 22,208
Cameroon -0.325*** -1.415*** -1.745*** -2.204*** 0.151 Namibia -22.250*** -28.979*** -30.985*** -26.802*** -24.160***
(0.076) (0.163) (0.174) (0.222) (0.289) (1.840) (4.334) (4.364) (4.934) (5.033)
R2 0.543 0.547 0.547 0.550 0.552 R2 0.574 0.577 0.577 0.581 0.584
Observations 26,618 26,618 26,618 26,618 26,618 Observations 14,838 14,838 14,838 14,838 14,838
Ethiopia -5.320*** -8.064*** -17.118*** -13.664*** -13.862*** Nigeria -2.335*** -3.785*** -7.424*** -8.228*** -9.166***
(1.042) (1.721) (2.150) (2.286) (2.363) (0.325) (0.371) (0.557) (0.670) (0.857)
R2 0.393 0.399 0.402 0.404 0.405 R2 0.418 0.421 0.423 0.426 0.426
Observations 32,802 32,802 32,802 32,802 32,802 Observations 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837
Ghana -2.715*** -2.653*** -4.736*** -5.406*** -5.141*** Rwanda -0.406*** -0.792*** -0.953*** -0.771*** -0.806***
(0.239) (0.336) (0.372) (0.453) (0.543) (0.045) (0.109) (0.118) (0.118) (0.155)
R2 0.477 0.480 0.484 0.487 0.487 R2 0.543 0.547 0.547 0.550 0.550
Observations 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,801 24,801 24,801 24,801 24,801
Guinea -0.649*** -1.330*** -2.131*** -2.841*** -1.905* Senegal -1.086*** -0.703*** -1.070*** -0.902*** -1.057***
(0.188) (0.363) (0.396) (0.485) (0.699) (0.104) (0.140) (0.169) (0.187) (0.296)
R2 0.475 0.477 0.477 0.478 0.478 R2 0.519 0.523 0.523 0.527 0.527
Observations 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,575 20,575 20,575 20,575 20,575
Kenya -1.612*** -0.790* -1.172*** -0.738* -0.725* Uganda -0.719*** -0.288* -0.740*** -0.916*** -0.596***
(0.153) (0.256) (0.293) (0.339) (0.342) (0.076) (0.089) (0.117) (0.134) (0.154)
R2 0.502 0.527 0.527 0.533 0.533 R2 0.530 0.536 0.537 0.540 0.541
Observations 18,557 18,557 18,557 18,557 18,557 Observations 32,746 32,746 32,746 32,746 32,746
Malawi -0.720*** -0.663*** -1.361*** -1.101*** -1.128*** Zimbabwe -10.589*** -9.586* -13.000* -12.432* -14.037***
(0.052) (0.067) (0.083) (0.091) (0.101) (2.432) (2.974) (4.019) (3.956) (4.213)
R2 0.540 0.540 0.542 0.544 0.544 R2 0.586 0.589 0.589 0.590 0.591
Observations 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 Observations 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,759
Exposure*Region FE no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes
Age*PfPR no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
Year of birth*Region FE no no no yes yes no no no yes yes
Exposure from 1998*PfPR no no no no yes no no no no yes
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Delay” stands for delay
status for grade level. All estimates include fixed effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 10: Impact of RBM’s campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: IV estimates for grade
Grade Grade
Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Burkina Faso 66.349*** 69.906*** 56.608*** 41.293*** 63.320*** 66.744*** Mali 16.139*** 31.217*** 12.295*** 8.173*** 28.030*** 6.141***
(4.539) (4.525) (5.189) (4.024) (4.659) (4.482) (3.865) (4.309) (2.351) (1.805) (4.342) (1.790)
R2 0.673 0.669 0.674 0.686 0.674 0.672 R2 0.640 0.618 0.642 0.643 0.624 0.645
Observations 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 Observations 22,208 22,208 22,208 21,905 22,208 22,208
DWH χ2 253.87*** 366.668*** 20.436*** 26.7543*** 219.725*** 247.071*** DWH χ2 22.4013*** 139.45*** 35.4197*** 13.8951*** 157.899*** 1.51551
Cameroon 9.723* 11.713*** 4.940ˆ 14.595*** 54.162*** 15.569* Namibia 158.298*** 164.785*** 150.343*** 211.423*** 165.695*** 175.121***
(3.807) (3.469) (2.674) (4.143) (13.421) (5.631) (27.125) (26.450) (24.527) (36.250) (32.562) (41.775)
R2 0.668 0.667 0.669 0.666 0.619 0.665 R2 0.728 0.727 0.728 0.709 0.728 0.727
Observations 26,591 26,591 26,591 26,569 26,618 26,618 Observations 14,733 14,733 14,733 10,967 14,838 14,838
DWH χ2 9.62249*** 16.9888*** 2.9644*** 25.8562*** 78.5738*** 12.2571*** DWH χ2 70.21*** 84.8419*** 86.0124*** 52.9826*** 43.7214*** 43.8716***
Ethiopia 256.576*** 239.641*** 106.021*** 185.278*** 210.506*** 248.735 Nigeria 128.530*** 148.985*** 82.395*** 65.222*** 107.502*** 133.584***
(43.904) (40.702) (22.116) (38.479) (58.895) (162.870) (13.006) (12.392) (6.637) (9.018) (10.348) (19.019)
R2 0.531 0.534 0.550 0.552 0.539 0.532 R2 0.502 0.485 0.529 0.535 0.516 0.498
Observations 32,802 32,802 32,802 26,919 32,802 32,802 Observations 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837
DWH χ2 121.235*** 137.036*** 63.2621*** 75.5724*** 44.3767*** 0.80365 DWH χ2 216.643*** 498.722*** 244.082*** 40.5173*** 200.16*** 114.32***
Ghana 59.289*** 61.230*** 35.338*** 64.256*** 55.532*** 34.795*** Rwanda 1.392 1.502 -0.638 4.632* 0.832 0.234
(7.044) (5.710) (3.810) (6.423) (10.659) (7.450) (1.462) (1.498) (1.012) (1.513) (2.790) (6.263)
R2 0.580 0.577 0.601 0.573 0.584 0.601 R2 0.671 0.671 0.671 0.674 0.671 0.671
Observations 12,781 12,781 12,781 12,827 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,801 24,801 24,801 19,155 24,801 24,801
DWH χ2 123.541*** 168.616*** 61.845*** 177.103*** 35.9611*** 14.0124*** DWH χ2 0.484962 0.615846 3.34724ˆ 6.64333** 0.00532 0.006551
Guinea 52.903* 133.409*** 32.332* 1.476 199.075 -166.139ˆ Senegal 180.108*** 147.513*** 20.262*** 83.634*** 65.469*** 3.132
(23.250) (30.502) (10.205) (8.167) (181.033) (98.444) (37.882) (34.609) (4.454) (15.857) (15.499) (5.025)
R2 0.600 0.483 0.613 0.618 0.305 0.369 R2 . 0.128 0.623 0.477 0.539 0.630
Observations 12,390 12,390 12,390 12,467 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,442 20,442 20,442 20,575 20,575 20,575
DWH χ2 10.9321*** 75.0614*** 14.5954*** 0.233242 15.1594*** 21.7337*** DWH χ2 234.294*** 195.628*** 25.9156*** 132.852*** 77.4894*** -8.13117
Kenya 30.282*** 31.169* 7.303ˆ -4.315 8.937 -1.770 Uganda 4.627* 3.526* 0.182 3.107 -4.112 0.678
(9.135) (9.886) (4.100) (3.288) (13.240) (3.364) (2.210) (1.439) (1.141) (2.990) (3.936) (1.823)
R2 0.723 0.723 0.730 0.721 0.731 0.731 R2 0.702 0.702 0.703 0.703 0.701 0.703
Observations 18,503 18,503 18,503 15,895 18,557 18,557 Observations 32,746 32,746 32,746 31,497 32,746 32,746
DWH χ2 23.7101*** 24.9725*** 3.16343ˆ 7.98147*** 0.577644 0.649948 DWH χ2 7.88189** 7.76115** -3.51849 0.809648 -1.91067 -3.42264
Malawi 3.889* 3.506* 0.999 5.008*** 3.741* -1.379 Zimbabwe 137.657*** 137.559*** 67.882* 105.601* 466.017* 100.789*
(1.307) (1.193) (0.619) (1.319) (1.818) (1.170) (39.433) (37.692) (22.456) (34.586) (155.258) (31.797)
R2 0.703 0.704 0.704 0.703 0.704 0.704 R2 0.762 0.762 0.764 0.763 0.730 0.763
Observations 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 Observations 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,603 23,759 23,759
DWH χ2 17.8848*** 17.4337*** 4.25216* 34.977*** 8.83961*** 2.97191ˆ DWH χ2 45.0543*** 61.1183*** 28.979*** 46.1164*** 49.3683*** 34.5475***
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Grade” stands for grade level during the year when the interview is conducted.
All estimates include fixed effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as exposure-by-region, age-by-PfPR, cohort-by-region, exposure since 1998-by-PfPR, and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors
(in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 11: Impact of RBM’s campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: IV estimates for years
Years Years
Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Burkina Faso 76.563*** 79.982*** 59.996*** 45.202*** 74.856*** 64.526*** Mali 18.356*** 31.924*** 11.562*** 7.456*** 26.603*** 6.311***
(5.648) (5.409) (6.818) (4.503) (5.544) (4.326) (4.127) (4.373) (2.357) (1.801) (4.299) (1.885)
R2 0.677 0.674 0.682 0.697 0.679 0.687 R2 0.635 0.614 0.641 0.641 0.624 0.642
Observations 15,447 15,447 15,447 15,447 15,447 15,447 Observations 22,198 22,198 22,198 21,895 22,198 22,198
DWH χ2 205.811*** 376.775*** -110.413 18.2215*** 238.989*** 245.68*** DWH χ2 31.7943*** 144.396*** 30.2533*** 10.4817** 137.606*** 3.53677ˆ
Cameroon 8.425* 10.445* 4.363 14.212*** 49.997*** 15.108* Namibia 149.145*** 156.575*** 144.036*** 206.301*** 162.724*** 176.856***
(3.762) (3.477) (2.678) (3.734) (12.597) (5.281) (26.824) (26.150) (24.504) (35.103) (32.084) (41.190)
R2 0.669 0.668 0.670 0.667 0.627 0.667 R2 0.724 0.724 0.725 0.708 0.724 0.723
Observations 26,590 26,590 26,590 26,568 26,617 26,617 Observations 14,726 14,726 14,726 10,964 14,831 14,831
DWH χ2 7.83418** 13.8353*** 2.92116ˆ 26.4173*** 69.4325*** 12.3016*** DWH χ2 57.7384*** 71.3244*** 73.3893*** 47.5931*** 39.5495*** 42.3648***
Ethiopia 251.276*** 235.166*** 104.258*** 181.350*** 203.996*** 691.873 Nigeria 115.612*** 128.740*** 74.017*** 69.311*** 89.198*** 117.226***
(44.078) (40.475) (22.184) (38.690) (58.660) (1207.235) (13.075) (11.912) (6.777) (9.840) (10.547) (19.133)
R2 0.534 0.536 0.552 0.553 0.541 0.376 R2 0.525 0.516 0.545 0.547 0.539 0.524
Observations 32,804 32,804 32,804 26,920 32,804 32,804 Observations 28,831 28,831 28,831 28,831 28,831 28,831
DWH χ2 116.591*** 134.09*** 63.0691*** 73.6684*** 41.5934*** 2.27999 DWH χ2 170.246*** 355.483*** 190.862*** 53.6553*** 126.772*** 84.4441***
Ghana 59.170*** 60.598*** 34.567*** 63.152*** 51.619*** 34.867*** Rwanda 2.562ˆ 2.631ˆ -0.306 5.539*** 2.493 -0.881
(6.963) (5.616) (3.778) (6.370) (9.731) (7.708) (1.535) (1.574) (1.052) (1.637) (3.012) (6.646)
R2 0.587 0.585 0.608 0.582 0.595 0.608 R2 0.692 0.692 0.692 0.694 0.692 0.692
Observations 12,781 12,781 12,781 12,827 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,777 24,777 24,777 19,133 24,777 24,777
DWH χ2 126.638*** 167.169*** 62.2582*** 170.578*** 34.6907*** 14.1566*** DWH χ2 3.35861ˆ 3.45349ˆ 1.64413 12.6869*** 0.656232 0.076769
Guinea 61.027* 128.006*** 35.590*** 2.833 168.995 -136.948 Senegal 171.986*** 141.300*** 18.408*** 80.377*** 61.876*** 1.997
(23.501) (29.341) (9.806) (8.059) (152.704) (85.348) (36.046) (33.006) (4.382) (15.284) (15.283) (5.557)
R2 0.593 0.494 0.611 0.617 0.394 0.438 R2 . 0.167 0.624 0.487 0.548 0.631
Observations 12,390 12,390 12,390 12,467 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,437 20,437 20,437 20,570 20,570 20,570
DWH χ2 14.4847*** 68.2871*** 16.7977*** 0.259822 10.8358*** 15.6016*** DWH χ2 220.265*** 184.672*** 23.1096*** 125.981*** 71.3478*** -8.03886
Kenya 27.754* 29.882* 6.400 -7.279* 11.874 103.368 Uganda 5.131* 3.724* 0.081 3.335 -3.443 0.745
(8.956) (9.994) (4.176) (3.338) (12.792) (218.207) (2.308) (1.499) (1.159) (3.026) (3.940) (1.845)
R2 0.733 0.732 0.739 0.730 0.739 0.643 R2 0.708 0.708 0.709 0.710 0.708 0.709
Observations 18,501 18,501 18,501 15,893 18,555 18,555 Observations 32,742 32,742 32,742 31,493 32,742 32,742
DWH χ2 23.1872*** 24.3335*** 2.97787ˆ 13.3977*** 1.15277 4.50122* DWH χ2 9.33602** 6.46545 0.890462 1.34558 2.93423ˆ -3.74719
Malawi 2.967* 2.415* 0.560 4.819*** 1.346 -2.201ˆ Zimbabwe 124.392*** 122.290*** 68.539* 134.687*** 385.302* 96.235***
(1.349) (1.213) (0.639) (1.352) (1.932) (1.253) (34.144) (31.985) (22.454) (36.537) (131.289) (27.877)
R2 0.705 0.705 0.706 0.704 0.706 0.705 R2 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.766 0.747 0.768
Observations 68,987 68,987 68,987 68,987 68,987 68,987 Observations 23,751 23,751 23,751 23,596 23,751 23,751
DWH χ2 12.3422*** 10.6367** 3.35114ˆ 37.1213*** 1.52422 5.01859* DWH χ2 33.7062*** 44.025*** 27.2823*** 77.1556*** 31.1151*** 28.9344***
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Years” stands for the total years of schooling. All estimates include fixed
effects for cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as exposure-by-region, age-by-PfPR, cohort-by-region, exposure since 1998-by-PfPR, and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered
at the DHS cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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Table 12: Impact of RBM’s campaign on primary students’ educational outcomes: IV estimates for delay
Delay Delay
Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI Set I Set II Set III Set IV Set V Set VI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Burkina Faso -16.255*** -17.242*** -13.961*** -8.267*** -15.515*** -16.699*** Mali -7.092*** -13.342*** -5.311*** -2.990*** -11.881*** -1.564*
(1.229) (1.232) (1.379) (0.951) (1.236) (1.245) (1.277) (1.418) (0.762) (0.530) (1.419) (0.553)
R2 0.560 0.557 0.560 0.573 0.561 0.559 R2 0.500 0.452 0.507 0.511 0.466 0.512
Observations 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 15,448 Observations 22,208 22,208 22,208 21,905 22,208 22,208
DWH χ2 167.254*** 241.702*** -8.11812 7.75277** 146.935*** 172.282*** DWH χ2 39.681*** 223.982*** 61.3205*** 12.519*** 249.283*** -13.3262
Cameroon -3.851*** -5.595*** -3.257*** -4.050*** -28.046*** -4.964* Namibia -102.379*** -101.906*** -86.576*** -89.194*** -110.595*** -102.966***
(1.159) (1.171) (0.906) (1.080) (5.569) (1.599) (7.414) (7.038) (7.117) (11.047) (11.111) (13.320)
R2 0.549 0.545 0.550 0.548 0.368 0.546 R2 0.568 0.568 0.574 0.557 0.564 0.568
Observations 26,591 26,591 26,591 26,569 26,618 26,618 Observations 14,733 14,733 14,733 10,967 14,838 14,838
DWH χ2 22.0718*** 51.3805*** 28.0498*** 25.224*** 217.816*** 14.8749*** DWH χ2 272.982*** 297.286*** 239.708*** 88.5971*** 184.85*** 136.071***
Ethiopia -171.449*** -147.241*** -64.811*** -141.374*** -147.851*** -160.050* Nigeria -45.823*** -59.988*** -31.729*** -22.957*** -46.584*** -53.344***
(17.015) (15.236) (7.774) (18.075) (24.620) (73.983) (3.930) (4.439) (2.122) (2.658) (3.492) (6.216)
R2 0.246 0.291 0.388 0.290 0.290 0.268 R2 0.369 0.316 0.404 0.418 0.366 0.343
Observations 32,802 32,802 32,802 26,919 32,802 32,802 Observations 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837 28,837
DWH χ2 644.442*** 604.135*** 259.316*** 499.456*** 260.906*** 3.9878* DWH χ2 252.85*** 778.371*** 354.936*** 45.2873*** 384.609*** 176.056***
Ghana -23.169*** -24.942*** -14.631*** -24.008*** -25.326*** -16.449*** Rwanda -4.910*** -5.034*** -2.372*** -5.761*** -7.817*** -2.348
(2.552) (2.096) (1.195) (2.213) (3.978) (2.160) (0.549) (0.563) (0.377) (0.616) (1.333) (2.203)
R2 0.435 0.424 0.473 0.430 0.421 0.467 R2 0.536 0.535 0.548 0.536 0.508 0.548
Observations 12,781 12,781 12,781 12,827 12,835 12,835 Observations 24,801 24,801 24,801 19,155 24,801 24,801
DWH χ2 187.363*** 278.922*** 127.33*** 238.634*** 84.2977*** 43.5865*** DWH χ2 119.01*** 121.178*** 37.0337*** 142.49*** 73.2186*** 0.638573
Guinea -27.498* -56.662*** -13.423*** 2.040 -65.718 49.832ˆ Senegal -83.571*** -68.038*** -6.323*** -35.012*** -28.776*** -2.144
(9.819) (12.291) (3.700) (2.728) (56.698) (29.720) (16.522) (15.293) (1.336) (6.289) (5.923) (1.485)
R2 0.415 0.190 0.465 0.476 0.086 0.220 R2 . . 0.517 0.184 0.298 0.526
Observations 12,390 12,390 12,390 12,467 12,509 12,509 Observations 20,442 20,442 20,442 20,575 20,575 20,575
DWH χ2 27.5501*** 116.175*** 23.7608*** 1.51936 13.6709*** 16.4057*** DWH χ2 493.463*** 409.082*** 26.85*** 232.739*** 152.123*** -4.3949
Kenya -7.486*** -6.904*** -2.187* 0.377 -23.789* -0.990 Uganda -7.981*** -5.549*** -2.927*** -10.163*** -15.030*** -4.983*
(1.933) (1.926) (0.832) (0.659) (8.207) (0.774) (2.036) (1.432) (0.464) (1.884) (3.476) (1.701)
R2 0.522 0.524 0.532 0.545 0.404 0.533 R2 0.490 0.518 0.536 0.464 0.348 0.523
Observations 18,503 18,503 18,503 15,895 18,557 18,557 Observations 32,746 32,746 32,746 31,497 32,746 32,746
DWH χ2 20.738*** 17.936*** 4.56018* 1.46527 83.9699*** -0.017713 DWH χ2 227.819*** 192.69*** 81.8028*** 328.839*** 309.411*** 58.5665***
Malawi -8.855*** -8.481*** -2.754*** -5.941*** -13.359*** -2.104*** Zimbabwe -88.559*** -90.356*** -35.874*** -78.084*** -434.190*** -38.614***
(0.628) (0.550) (0.196) (0.497) (1.027) (0.298) (19.109) (19.022) (8.633) (22.279) (111.881) (9.895)
R2 0.481 0.487 0.541 0.520 0.387 0.543 R2 0.573 0.572 0.589 0.577 0.037 0.589
Observations 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 68,995 Observations 23,759 23,759 23,759 23,603 23,759 23,759
DWH χ2 945.079*** 1042.75*** 205.028*** 425.351*** 1297.64*** 14.3292*** DWH χ2 181.005*** 257.945*** 55.8959*** 254.373*** 456.618*** 31.2468***
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient of interest from Equation (3). The unit of observation is the primary school student. The dependent variable “Delay” stands for delay status for grade level. All estimates include fixed effects for
cohort, cluster, and survey year as well as exposure-by-region, age-by-PfPR, cohort-by-region, exposure since 1998-by-PfPR, and individual covariates (age, gender, wealth). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the DHS
cluster level. ˆ, *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, 1 and 0.1% levels.
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